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NOTES
Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in
the Wake of Welfare Reform
Rigel Oliveri*
The recent national efforts at reforming the welfare system and new re-
search on the connection between teen pregnancy and statutory rape have led
many states to enact stricter laws against statutory rape and to increase the
enforcement of existing laws. Punitive statutory rape laws are being viewed
more and more as a mechanism for shrinking the welfare rolls by reducing teen
pregnancy. Rigel Oliveri documents the resurgence of statutory rape law and
enforcement and explores the ramifications it will have on teen parents. In
particular, Oliveri approaches the issue from several analytical frameworks,
discussing arguments for consent-based standards, the privacy and substantive
due process rights of both teens and offenders, and the practical needs of par-
enting teens. She also examines some of the theoretical tensions and piyfalls in-
herent in the criminal prosecution of teen pregnancies. This discussion leads to
suggestions for possible improvements in the prosecution of statutory rape
cases, as well as to the more radical proposal to eliminate many statutory rape
laws altogether.
Marguerite is just afew weeks shy of her sixteenth birthday. Her son is
two-and-one-halfyears old. Her mother, already in poverty with an unstable
living situation, kicked Marguerite out of the house when she became preg-
nant. Now Marguerite lives in the home ofa family fi'end, relying on wel-
fare benefits and Food Stamps to support herself She attends school spo-
radically, and will probably stop altogether.
The baby's father, Tomas, is in his early twenties. Tomas used to be
Marguerite's boyfriend. When Marguerite became pregnant at thirteen,
Tomas indicated his willingness to help care for the child. Despite the fact
that their relationship was occasionally violent, Marguerite hoped the two
* Clerk for the Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 1999. B.A., University of Virginia, 1994. I am grateful to Jenny Home of
the Teen Parents' Project for her assistance, insight, and guidance, and for inspiring me through her
work with teens. My thanks also to George Fisher for his supervision of this project, as well as to
Barbara Babcock, Dorothy Roberts, and Lois Weithom for their input and observations. Finally, I
would never have been able to complete this note without the constant support and encouragement I
received from Terry Gray.
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would get married and start a family. But as her due date came closer
Tomas became distant, and they eventually stopped seeing one another. Now
he lives nearby with a new, older girlfriend and has nothing to do with Mar-
guerite or the child. She obtained a court-ordered paternity test, which indi-
cates that he is indeed the father. Still, Tomas has never paid child support,
and refuses to acknowledge paternity.
Marguerite is hurt, furious, broke, and alone in the task of raising her
son. Her benefits may be cut off soon because of a new provision of the
welfare law that requires teen parents to live with a relative to be eligible for
assistance. She needs help retaining her benefits and obtaining a child sup-
port order against Tomas. Unfortunately, even if an order is issued, it is un-
likely that he will ever pay. He is unemployed, undocumented, and a gang
member. Marguerite desperately wants Tomas brought to court. She asks if
he can be arrested for getting her pregnant when she was so young and then
abandoning her. "All I really wish, " she says, "is for him to come in and for
the judge to tell him that he was wrong for what he did to me-that he should
be helping to raise his son and that he shouldn'tjust ignore me like nothing
ever happened."
Allison has just turned sixteen. She had her first baby when she was
thirteen, and atfifteen she gave birth to twins. Allison 'sfather was unable to
take care of her after she became pregnant the first time. He was already
receiving welfare benefits and raising her younger siblings. Her mother has
a history of drug abuse, and Allison does not know her whereabouts. Allison
lives in a tiny one-bedroom apartment with the children and their father,
twenty-two-year-old Marcus. He is an undocumented immigrant who sup-
ports the family through odd jobs. Every dollar he earns goes to pay the
rent. Allison also receives welfare benefits and Food Stamps for herself and
the children.
Allison stays home and cares for the children while Marcus works. He
helps her with the housework, and his sisters occasionally stop by to keep
her company or watch the children. The couple plan to marry as soon as
they get herfather's legal consent.
Allison needs legal help to facilitate the parental consent to marriage
and because she is in danger of having her benefits terminated. A new pro-
vision in the welfare law requires that she both attend school and live with a
relative, unless she is married. She has not been to school in three years-
since the eighth grade-and is terrified at the prospect of returning. Social
services has been closely involved with her case. While there has been talk
of the large age difference between the two parents, all those involved are
reluctant to report Marcus to the authorities because he plays such an im-
[Vol. 52:463
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portant role in the family. As her three children wail in concert, Allison asks
for help: "I want to stay here and not go back to school. And I want to
marry Marcus. Please don't let them report us. We do OK here. We are
trying. "'
INTRODUCTION
The stories of Marguerite and Allison share many common elements:
both were impregnated at a young age by adult men; neither lives with a par-
ent; both are indigent and receive welfare benefits; both are in danger of
losing these benefits due to changes in welfare eligibility; and neither is
likely to graduate from high school. Most significant for the purposes of this
note is the fact that both girls have been the victims of felony statutory rape
as it is defined by their state's penal code. If prosecuted, both Tomas and
Marcus could face lengthy prison sentences, thousands of dollars in civil
penalties, and deportation. There is, however, one crucial difference: For
Marguerite, a statutory rape prosecution of Tomas would be a vindication of
her suffering, a punishment imposed upon him for the pain and hardship he
has caused her. For Allison, a statutory rape prosecution of Marcus would be
a nightmare, depriving her of a crucial source of income and support. This
difference, and what to do about it, defines the contours of some of the most
difficult policy debates in America today.
This note examines the dilemma of statutory rape in light of the recent
nationwide trend toward stricter statutory rape laws and stepped-up enforce-
ment activity. Part I contains a brief historical overview of statutory rape
laws, with a focus on the changing normative goals underlying the laws in
different historical contexts. Part II locates the origins of the current legisla-
tive and enforcement trends in the recent movement to reform the country's
welfare system. It discusses the impact of the federal legislation on teen par-
ents, and examines sociological data on the correlation between teen preg-
nancy and statutory rape. Part III surveys various states' legislative and en-
forcement efforts to "get tough" on statutory rape.
Part IV examines some of the analytical difficulties presented by stricter
statutory rape laws and their aggressive enforcement. Specifically, this Part
looks at: the issues of teens' capacity for consent and the role that they
should play in the prosecution decision; the privacy and substantive due pro-
cess rights of both teens and offenders; and the practical needs of parenting
teens. These issues lead to a modest proposal for changing the way in which
statutory rape cases are prosecuted.
1. These two stories are based on encounters that I had while working for the Teen Parents'
Project in San Mateo County, California during the spring of 1998. I have changed only the names
in each story to respect the privacy of the individuals involved.
Jan. 2000]
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Part V explores the inherent problems and paradoxes in the current leg-
islative and enforcement trends. In particular, it examines the conflicting
goals of aggressively punitive policies, the disconnect between the law in
theory and the law as it is applied, and the fact that stricter laws and policies
are unlikely to have a significant effect. These findings lead to a bolder sug-
gestion: that we may instead want to reconsider whether to have statutory
rape laws at all.
I. STATUTORY RAPE LAW, PAST AND PRESENT
Throughout history, societies have used statutory rape laws to accom-
plish a variety of normative goals. Examining the details and purposes of a
particular society's laws against statutory rape can reveal a great deal about
that society's conception of gender roles, morality, and sexuality. Who is
targeted, who is protected, and why can reveal the scope and details of a
community's priorities and assumptions as well as a history book.
Statutory rape laws have existed for thousands of years in one form or
another, with some authors arguing that they appear in the ancient Code of
Hammurabi.2 Statutory rape laws were incorporated into English law in the
thirteenth century, and later absorbed into the American legal system from
the English common law.3 Several factors indicate that the primary purpose
behind these early laws was to protect the chastity of vulnerable, virtuous
young women, treating them as "special property in need of special protec-
tion."4 First, early statutory rape laws were gender specific, criminalizing
adult sexual relations with girls, but not boys. In addition, defendants could
raise a promiscuity defense, arguing that no crime occurred if the victim was
herself sexually experienced-thus possessing no chastity to steal. This has
led some scholars to conclude that statutory rape law served more to protect
girls' chastity than to actually punish men who coerced sex from them.5
The late nineteenth century saw a wave of statutory rape law reform.
Concerned about the spread of disease and protecting young girls from
abuse, an odd coalition of Victorian feminists, Socialists, religious groups,
2. See Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 757, 762 (1980) (discussing the history of statutory rape). Other scholars disagree, dating
statutory rape laws back to ancient Rome. See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the
Criminal Law: In Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 7 n.10 (1997).
3. See Eidson, supra note 2, at 762.
4. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,25 (1994).
5. See id. at 27 (arguing that the early law was geared toward protecting virginity, not pun-
ishing coercive sex with minors). For a more recent articulation of this purpose, see State v. Vicars,
183 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Neb. 1971) ("The object of the [statutory rape] statute is to protect the virtu-
ous maidens and the undefiled virgins of the State and not the unchaste female.").
[Vol. 52:463
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and Progressives mobilized to strengthen the laws and raise the age of con-
sent.6 They succeeded, and these achievements were a victory for the moral
reform movement, which had "social purity" and uplift of the lower classes
as its primary concerns. 7 Such movements in the Victorian Era were simul-
taneously self-righteous and protective, motivated as much by the fear of
licentiousness among the poor as concern for their well-being.8
Little changed in statutory rape law until the 1970s. In the wake of the
sexual revolution and at the beginning of the modem feminist movement,
statutory rape laws across the country were both liberalized and modernized.
The atmosphere of sexual liberation and women's empowerment may have
caused some feminists, if anything, to want to expand girls' sexual freedom
and options and to abandon outdated expectations of chastity for teen girls.9
Many states began passing gender-neutral statutory rape laws. Several states
decriminalized sex among teenagers, and set up a framework in which sex
would only be prohibited if the victim were under the age of consent and
there was a significant age gap between the parties. Other states abandoned
the "promiscuity" defense altogether, although several retained it.10 It was at
this point that a new rationale emerged for statutory rape laws, particularly
the ones that remained gender specific. As the Supreme Court made clear in
perhaps the best-known of all statutory rape cases, Michael M. v. Sonoma
Country Superior Court, the state's interest in preventing out-of-wedlock
teen pregnancy was now considered an important purpose of statutory rape
law.11 The Court specifically found the state had an interest in reducing the
negative "social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother
and her child," as well as in lowering the high abortion rate for teens.12
Despite the pregnancy prevention rationale, with the increased level of
sexual activity and more permissive social mores of the next two decades,
existing statutory rape laws fell into disuse. Like other laws pertaining to
sexual morality, they were infrequently enforced and often not taken seri-
ously. For example, in Michael M, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted
that during the three year period from 1975 to 1978 an annual average of 413
6. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 402-03 (1984) (describing the statutory rape reform movements in nineteenth century
England and America).
7. Oberman, supra note 4, at 27.
8. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 6, at 403 (arguing that "conservative antivice elements domi-
nated the reform movement and coopted feminists' efforts"); Oberman, supra note 5, at 27 (com-
menting on the repressive and moralistic nature of the nineteenth century movements).
9. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 31 (arguing that statutory rape law "seemed anachronistic to
those who favored 'sexual liberation"' during the sexual revolution of the 1970s).
10. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code retained it. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(3)
(1980).
11. 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (finding that California's gender-specific statutory rape statute
was motivated by a strong interest in preventing "illegitimate" teenage pregnancies).
12. Id. at 470-71.
Jan. 2000]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 467 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVIEW[
men and boys were arrested for statutory rape in California, despite ap-
proximately 50,000 pregnancies among women ages thirteen to seventeen
during 1976 alone.13
Currently, however, statutory rape laws are experiencing a comeback.I4
Across the country, prosecutors' offices and police are increasing their en-
forcement activity, and state legislatures are drafting stricter laws with higher
penalties. Congress is calling for tougher enforcement of statutory rape laws,
and the Attorney General will be involved in studying the problem in great
detail. This trend would seem anomalous, considering that social mores are
still permissive regarding sexuality, and that the last few decades have seen
more extensive protection of teens' privacy rights as they relate to matters
such as contraception and abortion. As the following Part demonstrates, the
explanation for this renewed emphasis can be found, quite clearly, in the ran-
corous debate over welfare reform.
II. BACKGROUND ON TEEN PREGNANCY AND WELFARE REFORM
Much of the current focus on strengthening and enforcing statutory rape
laws can be traced to the welfare reform movement that swept through the
country in the mid-1990s, culminating in the passage of The Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in
1996.15 Ending welfare as we know it became a national priority, and there
was widespread consensus that doing so would require aggressively taclding
the problem of teen pregnancy. This is evident in the strong emphasis that
PRWORA placed on reducing teen pregnancy, and the direct and indirect
effects its provisions have on teen parents. As explained below, two influ-
ential studies that emerged just as the welfare debate began suggested the use
of statutory rape laws as a means of reducing teen pregnancy.
A. The Emphasis on Teen Pregnancy
Preventing teenage pregnancy was a central issue in the efforts to reform
welfare. For decades, childbearing by teens had been viewed as one of the
most pervasive and insidious social problems in America, linked to poverty,
increased school drop-out rates, crime, and a host of other social ills.16 The
13. See id. at 493 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. See infra Part IV for a more detailed look at the various legislative and law enforcement
efforts.
15. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16. See generally, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE
PREGNANCY (1996) (reviewing the historical and present day effects of teenage pregnancy in
America); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, 124-34
(1984) (analyzing the statistics and social impact of being an unwed mother); Sue Woodman, How
[Vol. 52:463
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legislative findings which accompany PRWORA indicate quite clearly that
Congress was deeply concerned about teen pregnancy and its perceived link
to out-of-wedlock childbearing and poverty.17 The findings include:
" Young women 17 and under who give birth outside of marriage are more
likely to go on public assistance and to spend more years on welfare once
enrolled.18
" Between 1985 and 1990, the public cost of births to teenage mothers under
the aid to families with dependent children program, the food stamp pro-
gram, and the Medicaid program has been estimated at $120,000,000,000.19
* Children of teenage single parents have lower cognitive scores, lower edu-
cational aspirations, and a greater likelihood of becoming teenage parents
themselves.20
Ironically, PROWRA was enacted at a time when the teen birth rate was
steadily declining. Between 1991 and 1996, the teen birth rate declined
twelve percent nationwide, with declines observed in all states.21 However,
while the overall teen birth rate declined, the rate of out-of-wedlock teen
childbearing increased dramatically. Ironically, teens actually make up a
very small percentage of people receiving direct cash assistance. Only seven
percent of mothers receiving cash benefits in 1995 were teens, and only two
percent were minors under the age of eighteen.22 Nevertheless, teen preg-
nancy remains a concern because roughly half of the families receiving wel-
fare benefits were begun while the mother was a teenager.23 In addition,
even if teen pregnancy rates are on the decline, the numbers are still quite
high. In 1992, there were an estimated 112 pregnancies per 1000 girls be-
tween the ages of fifteen and nineteen-which means that eleven percent of
Teen Pregnancy Has Become a Political Football, Ms., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 90 (discussing the link
between welfare reform and teen pregnancy as political issues).
17. For a persuasive criticism of the assumptions that teen pregnancy causes poverty and that
teens are primarily responsible for the rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing, see Megan Weinstein,
The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem". Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 127-39 (1998). See
also Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending Poverty by Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise, Failure, and
Paths to the Future, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 441,455-61 (1996) (arguing that teenage pregnancy does not
cause poverty and other negative outcomes, but rather is correlated with them).
18. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(8)(A), 110 Stat. 2105, 2111 (1996).
19. Id. § 101 (9)(G), I10 Stat. at 2112.
20. Id. § 101 (9)(1), 110 Stat. at 2112.
21. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, TEENAGE BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 1990-96
(1989); see also Patricia Donovan, Falling Teen Pregnancy. Birthrates: What's Behind the De-
clines?, I THE GUTrMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 5, Oct. 1998, at 6.
22. See Jodie Leven-Epstein, Teen Parent Provisions in the New Law, THE CENTER FOR LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.clasp.org/pubs/teens/teens.htmnl>.
23. See id.
Jan. 2000]
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all girls in this age group had a pregnancy that ended in 1992.24 Out of the
112 pregnancies, sixty-one ended in births, thirty-six in abortions, and fifteen
in miscarriages.25
Whatever the data actually reveal about teen pregnancy, the perception
of teen pregnancy on the part of legislators and the public became the more
important motivating factor in the welfare reform debate. Teen pregnancy
was viewed as a growing and increasingly threatening problem which could
(and should) be dealt with through changing welfare policies. As a result,
many of the provisions of the PRWORA either indirectly or directly affect
teen childbearing.
B. Changes in Welfare Policy
The PRWORA marked the most fundamental shift in welfare policy
since the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. It established the Tem-
porary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) block grant, which replaced the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In doing so, the
PRWORA transferred primary responsibility for determining welfare policy
and administering the program from the Federal Government to the states,
encouraging them to develop innovative approaches.26
The federal legislation sought to achieve two broad goals, one program-
matic and one normative. First, it eliminated the cash entitlement to needy
families that had been the hallmark of the AFDC program, and set time lim-
its and work requirements for the receipt of aid. Second, it "aimed at 're-
forming' sexual behavior and 'restoring' traditional family norms" by speci-
fying that federal funds be used to promote abstinence among the unwed and
to strengthen two-parent families.27
1. Indirect effects.
Some reforms indirectly affect teen parents by trying to reduce the size
and number of low-income, single-parent families (which are likely to in-
clude many teen-headed households) through individual and state-level in-
24. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Teenage Abortion and Pregnancy Statistics by State, 1992, 29
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 115, 116 (1997). These data were computed according to the girls' ages at the
time of the pregnancy outcome, not at the time of conception. When births, abortions, and miscar-
riages are measured according to the girl's age at conception, the rate rises to 130 pregnancies per
1000 girls aged 15 to 19. See id.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, ISSUES IN BRIEF: WELFARE REFORMi,
MARRIAGE AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 1 (1997) [hereinafter AGI ISSUES IN BRIEF] (discussing ad-
ministrative and programmatic changes).
27. Id.
[Vol. 52:463
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centive structures. For example, the PRWORA creates an "illegitimacy bo-
nus," which rewards states that lower their out-of-wedlock childbirth rates
while simultaneously lowering their abortion rates.28 The Federal Govern-
ment established few guidelines or rules to follow in competing for the bo-
nus; in the trend towards decentralized programming, strategies are left up to
the states. Many states have embarked on creative pilot programs, which run
the gamut from providing unwed couples with incentives to marry, to ex-
panding the availability of contraceptives through federally funded clinics, to
providing poor women with financial disincentives for continued childbear-
ing.
The most extreme of these financial disincentives are known as "family
caps," which limit the total amount of monthly assistance a family can re-
ceive.29 Once a family reaches its monetary limit, its benefits are capped,
even if the mother has additional children. Such provisions were initially an
explicit part of the PRWORA, but they were removed at the last minute, in
part because of the concern they caused with pro-life members of Congress
who feared that they would create incentives for women to have abortions.30
However, states are free to enact them, and at least nineteen already have. 31
Given the large percentages of teen parents who are unwed, these policies,
and others which states implement to lower the rate of out-of-wedlock child-
bearing, may have a disproportionate impact on teen parents.
2. Direct effects.
Several provisions of the PRWORA directly target teen parents. Minor
teen parents are required both to stay in school and to live in adult-supervised
settings as a condition of receiving TANF benefits.32 Early versions of the
28. See PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 403(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 110 Stat. 2105, 2118 (1996).
In each of four years, beginning in 1999, the five states that achieve the greatest decreases in out-of-
wedlock births and also reduce their abortion rate below the 1995 level will receive $20 million
each. States are encouraged to place special emphasis on reducing the number of out-of-wedlock
teenage pregnancies. See id. § 402(a)(1)(A)(v), 110 Stat. at 2113-14.
29. For criticisms of this policy and the deleterious effects that it may have on poor women's
reproductive decision-making, see Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abor-
tion: "Personal Responsibility, " "Family Values," and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155
(1996); Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family
Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1995).
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 2673 (1996); see also 142 CoNG. REc. S8395, 58399 (July
22, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ford) (requesting that a letter from the Catholic Bishops' Conference,
which expresses concern that family caps will encourage abortions, be printed in the Record); 142
CONG. REC. H7796, H7813 (July 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) (expressing concern that
family cap policies will encourage abortions).
3 1. See AGI ISSUES IN BRIEF, supra note 26, at 1.
32. See PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 408(a)(4), 110 Stat. 2105, 2135-36 (1996) (deny-
ing assistance for teenage parents who do not attend high school or other equivalent training pro-
gram); id. § 408(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 2137 (denying assistance for teenage parents not living in adult
supervised settings).
Jan. 2000]
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PRWORA would have prevented teen parents from ever qualifying for bene-
fits unless the mother married the child's biological father or another man
who would adopt the child.33 Congress modified this provision to allow mi-
nors to collect vouchers for child-care related goods and services, and later to
let them collect cash TANF benefits when they attained the age of majority.
34 When President Clinton signed the bill into law, however, he eliminated
this provision in favor of the education and living requirements. In addition,
the PRWORA grants fifty million dollars for states to use to implement ab-
stinence education programs, primarily targeted at teens and administered
through schools.35 Finally-and most significantly for the purposes of this
note-the PRWORA contains two provisions relating to statutory rape.
First, it requires the Attorney General to:
[E]stablish and implement a program that-
(1) studies the linkage between statutory rape and teenage pregnancy, particu-
larly by predatory older men committing repeat offenses; and
(2) educates State and local criminal law enforcement officials on the preven-
tion and prosecution of statutory rape, focusing in particular on the commission
of statutory rape by predatory older men committing repeat offenses, and any
links to teenage pregnancy. 36
Second, it offers a "sense of the Senate that States and local jurisdictions
should aggressively enforce statutory rape laws."37 Given these admonitions
and the amount of programmatic leeway that states have in competing for the
Illegitimacy Bonus, it is not surprising that many are looking at statutory
rape laws as a way to reduce both out-of-wedlock and teen births.
C. Influential Studies
Two influential studies on the patterns of teen sexuality, released just as
the debate over welfare reform was heating up, galvanized the PRWORA's
focus on the connection between teen pregnancy and statutory rape. The
first, a national study conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI),
found that half of the fathers of babies born to mothers between the ages of
fifteen and seventeen were twenty or older.38 Almost twenty percent of the
fathers were six or more years older, and, in general, the younger a mother
33. See H.R. 4, 104th Cong. § 105(a) (1995).
34. See id. § 405(a)(4)(C) (allowing teens to receive vouchers); H.R. 1214, 104th Cong. §
405(a)(4)(A) (1995) (allowing teen mothers to collect cash benefits once they turn eighteen - later
incorporated into H.R. 4).
35. See PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105, 2353-54 (1996).
36. Id. § 906(b)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 2349-50.
37. Id. at § 906(a), I 10 Stat. at 2349.
38. See David J. Landry & Jacqueline Dorroch Forrest, How Old Are US. Fathers?, 27 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 159, 160 (1995).
[ ol. 52:463
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was, the greater the age difference between her and her partner.39 The sec-
ond study, conducted by researchers at the University of California, Irvine,
documented the extent of adult male involvement in births among California
adolescents. It found that in 1993, two-thirds of babies born to school-age
mothers were fathered by men of post-high school age.4 0 For eighteen-year-
old mothers, the median adult father was 4.2 years older; for mothers be-
tween the ages of ten to fourteen, the median adult father was 6.7 years
older.4' Among California mothers aged ten to fourteen, sixty percent of the
fathers were between the ages of fifteen and nineteen and thirty-six percent
were twenty or over.42 For California mothers aged fifteen to seventeen, fifty
percent of the fathers were twenty or over.43
Additional research indicated that such early sexual encounters were
more likely to involve force or coercion; the majority of sexual experiences
occurring before age fourteen were described by the girls as "non-
voluntary."44 In addition, early sexual activity characterized by a large gap
in the ages of the parties was less likely to involve contraceptive use than
when the parties were closer in age.45 Finally, studies revealed that between
fifty four to sixty percent of adolescents who became pregnant had previ-
ously been victims of childhood sexual abuse or incest.46
These findings dramatically altered the way policy-makers, politicians,
and the public viewed teen pregnancy. They prompted a reevaluation of pre-
vention policy and explained why so many earlier attempts at reducing the
levels of teen pregnancy had been unsuccessful. Most of the previous pre-
vention efforts focused on abstinence education programs within high
schools or targeted teens exclusively, with less than impressive results.47
39. See id. at 161.
40. See Mike Males & Kenneth S.Y. Chew, The Ages of Fathers in California Adolescent
Births, 1993, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 565, 567 (1996).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 566 tbl. 1.
43. See id.
44. KRisnN A. MOORE, BRENT C. MILLER, BARBARA W. SUGLAND, DONNA RUANE
MORRISON, DANA A. GLEI, & CONNIE BLUMENTHAL, CHILD TRENDS, INC., BEGINNING TOO
SOON: ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, PREGNANCY, AND PARENTHOOD vii (1995).
45. See id.
46. See Debra Boyer & David Fine, Sexual Abuse as a Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy and
Child Maltreatment, 24 FAM. PLAN. PFRSP. 4, 10 (1992); see also Janice R. Butler and Linda M.
Burton, Rethinking Teenage Childbearing: Is Sexual Abuse a Missing Link, 39 FAM. REL. 73, 73
(1990).
47. The most ambitious and comprehensive of these programs was California's widely-
heralded and often-imitated Education Now And Babies Later (ENABL) Program. California
abruptly terminated the Program in February of 1996, when it was determined that, after four years
of intense efforts, youths who participated in ENABL were equally likely to have become sexually
active as teens who did not participate and had the same rates of pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases. See, e.g., Helen H. Cagampang, Richard P. Barth, Meg Korpi & Douglas Kirby, Educa-
tion Now and Babies Later (ENABL): Life History of a Campaign to Postpone Sexual Involvement,
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Such failures could be explained when viewed in light of the new sociologi-
cal data on statutory rape. Most obviously, teen-targeted programs failed to
reach an important segment of the population-the adult men who were in-
volved in many of the relationships. Furthermore, by emphasizing a "just
say no" message, abstinence programs failed to prepare teen girls for the
greater levels of coercion that they were experiencing from the adult men.
In addition, the sociological evidence allowed society to shift the blame
for teen pregnancy, out-of-wedlock childbearing, and welfare receipt-from
the teen to the adult male. Previously, it was often assumed that teen parents
were simply promiscuous and irresponsible, engaging in unprotected sex
with other teens and casually having babies in order to receive welfare bene-
fits.48 After these studies were released, it began to look more as though
large numbers of teens were being exploited by much older "predatory
males" and that the teens' sexual activity, lack of contraceptive use, and
pregnancies were less a product of free will than the sad result of criminal
victimization.
III. OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Many states have taken Congress' suggestion and developed a variety of
steps to "get tough" on statutory rape. These efforts-which I will collec-
tively refer to as "get tough" policies or measures-take three basic forms,
and many states are utilizing more than one. First, several states have un-
dertaken legal reforms, such as raising the age of consent or increasing the
penalties for certain types of statutory rape. For example, Florida passed
laws making it a third degree felony (technically child abuse) for a man older
than twenty-one to impregnate a girl younger than sixteen,49 and a second
degree felony for any person who is twenty-four or older to engage in sexual
activity with a sixteen or seventeen-year-old.0 Georgia raised its age of
consent from fourteen to sixteen.51 A bill that would raise Washington's age
of consent from sixteen to eighteen passed unanimously in the state's house
of representatives, but has since foundered in the state senate.52 Delaware
29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 109 (1997); Douglas Kirby, Meg Korpi, Richard P. Barth & Helen H. Ca-
gampang, The Impact of the Postponing Sexual Involvement Curriculum Among Youths in Califor-
nia, 29 FAm. PLAN. PERsP. 100 (1997).
48. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, A Criminal Record or a Wedding Band?, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 12, 1996, at A15 ("Maybe [teen mothers] are not just sexually immoral or calculating little
economists having babies for welfare checks.").
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(3) (West 1998).
50. See id. § 794.05(1).
51. Compare GA. CODEANN. § 16-6-3(a) (1996) with id. § 16-6-3 (1992).
52. See Debera Carlton Harrell, A Call to Raise Age of Consent, SEATrLE POST-
IT ELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al.
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passed the "Sexual Predator Act," which increased prison time for offend-
ers.53 California enacted a mandatory reporting requirement, under which all
youth service providers, health care workers, and educators will be crimi-
nally liable if they fail to report a suspected statutory rape of a minor under
the age of sixteen,54 and created civil penalties ranging from $2000 to
$25,000 for statutory rape offenders.55
Second, some states are increasing the enforcement of existing laws.
Some jurisdictions are merely voicing a renewed commitment to more ag-
gressive enforcement. In Louisiana, state and federal prosecutors have
promised to support the state's Initiative on Teen Pregnancy and Prevention
by increasing prosecutions for statutory rape.56 Similarly, prosecutors in
Richmond, Virginia announced a partnership between the city's health, po-
lice, and social services departments, in the hope that this will increase the
number of statutory rape cases reported, referred, and prosecuted.57 Other
states have developed more comprehensive enforcement strategies, creating
specialized prosecution units to focus exclusively on statutory rape cases.
California's initiative, the Statutory Rape Vertical Prosecution (SRVP) Pro-
gram is the most ambitious of these, currently operating in fifty-four of the
state's fifty-eight counties, with a budget of $8.4 million.58 Connecticut has
implemented a similar program on a smaller scale,59 and counties in New
York are getting statutory rape cases referred to them from social services
and setting up new bureaus to investigate the crimes.60 California's SRVP
Program provides funding for specialized prosecutors in the district attor-
neys' offices to follow each case all the way through the judicial process.
The funds also provide for specially-trained investigators and victim advo-
53. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (1996); 70 Del. Laws 600 (1996) ('[It is the intent of
the General Assembly to enhance the penalty for statutory rape....'D.
54. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (West Supp. 1999) with id. § 11165.1 (West
1992). See generally id. § 11166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (defining the duty to report).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(e)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1999).
56. See Bill Voelker, Prosecutors to Support Teen Pregnancy Program, NEW ORLEANs
TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 24, 1997, at B8 ("First Assistant District Attorney Camille Bums promised
more state prosecutions for statutory rape.").
57. See Dorine Bethea, Agencies to Target 'Sexual Predators': City's Goal to Enforce Statu-
tory Rape Law, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 4 1997, at BI ("[City officials announced yes-
terday a four-agency partnership to go after 'sexual predators,' .... ).
58. See THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, STATUTORY RAPE
VERTICAL PROSECUTION: THIRD YEAR REPORT 1 (1999) [hereinafter OCJP REPORT].
59. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Campaign Gives Men a Warning: Statutory Rape Will Not Be
Tolerated, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 1997, at A3 (reporting on the recent addition of a detec-
tive to the special prosecution unit); State's Top Prosecutor Appoints Two Women to Enforce
Statutory Rape Laws, NEWS-TIMES, (Oct. 25, 1996) <http://www.newstimes.com/archive96/
oct2596/rga.htm> (describing the state's formation of a special prosecution unit consisting of a
prosecutor and an investigator).
60. See Jon R. Sorensen, Pataki Welfare Reform Seeks to Reduce Illegitimate Births,
BUFFALO NEWs, Nov. 10, 1996, at Al.
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cates, operating expenses, and equipment to support the prosecution pro-
gram.61 In its first three years, the SRVP Program has dramatically increased
the number of statutory rape cases filed and prosecuted in the state of Cali-
fornia. Prior to the creation of the SRVP Program, most California jurisdic-
tions reported little or no enforcement of statutory rape law. In the SRVP
Program's third year of operation, prosecutors filed 2796 statutory rape
cases, with 1066 more awaiting filing pending completion of an investigative
phase.62 The vast majority of these cases (eighty-eight percent) resulted in a
conviction. Seventy-four percent of these convictions were for felonies, and
ninety-four percent of those convicted received prison, jail, or probation
sentences.63 From the SRVP Program's inception in 1995 to June 30,1998,
prosecutors have achieved a total of 3818 convictions for statutory rape.64 In
Santa Clara County, which receives the largest amount of SRVP Program
grant money, prosecutions jumped from 35 to 200 annually in the first two
years, with a conviction rate of ninety-eight percent.65
Finally, a few states are also using innovative tactics to raise awareness
and target potential offenders and victims. Georgia has printed thousands of
"Sex Cards" to apprise citizens of the statutory rape law and its penalties.66
Over 400,000 Sex Cards have been distributed to "churches, health agencies,
judges, police chiefs, and politicians" statewide.67 Similarly, in one Arizona
county, motorists who are pulled over for traffic violations also receive a
pamphlet urging the public to report suspected "predatory males" to the po-
lice.68 In New York, California, and Connecticut, massive public relations
campaigns employ billboards and radio ads to warn adults that sex with mi-
nors is against the law.69
All states are required by the PRWORA to submit plans to the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services as a condition of receiving
federal TANF funds. Each plan must contain, among other things, how the
state plans to "[c]onduct a program, designed to reach State and local law
61. See OCJP REPORT, supra note 58, at 2.
62. See id. at 3.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 9.
65. See Richard Whitmire, Enforcing Statutory Rape Laws Bringing Unintended Results,
GANNET NEVS SERVICE, July 24, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 8832861.
66. See Christy Oglesby, Wallet Card's Warning: Sex Can Land You in Jail, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Jan. 10, 1998, at D5.
67. Id.
68. See Patrick Graham, Adolescent Girls See Hunk, but Police See Child Molester, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 31, 1997, at 39.
69. See, e.g., Ohlemacher, supra note 59 (Connecticut); Sorensen, supra note 60 (New York);
Cheryl Wetzstein, California Fights Statutory Rape with Media, Cops, WASH. mS, Sept. 17,
1997 at A2 (California).
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enforcement officials, the education system, and relevant counseling serv-
ices, that provides education and training on the problem of statutory rape so
that teenage pregnancy prevention programs may be expanded in scope to
include men." 70 More than half of the states' plans merely track the language
in the PRWORA and indicate that the state will conduct a statutory rape edu-
cation program. The remaining states outline strategies that range from the
aggressive enforcement measures discussed above to the development of task
forces to study the problem.71
It appears from these efforts, and from the welfare debate background,
that the legal and public model of dealing with teen pregnancy has changed
from years past. Gone is the complaint that girls are left vulnerable targets of
male aggression to which society turns a blind eye. Instead, the predatory
male has become public enemy number one. This may be so, however, not
necessarily because of the danger he poses to girls, but because of the costs
he creates for society.
IV. ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATION
While there is consensus that adult males' sexual involvement with teen
girls is problematic, it is less clear whether the problem should be addressed
through the "get tough" measures outlined above. The intervention of the
criminal justice system may not always be appropriate or effective, particu-
larly when a pregnancy has already occurred. This Part attempts to isolate
and examine the factors that make intervention problematic according to
three analytical frameworks: the use of consent-based models, the privacy
and substantive due process rights of both parties, and the practical consid-
erations for parenting teens. Ultimately, I offer a modest proposal for re-
forming the enforcement of statutory rape laws that takes these factors into
account.
A. Consent-Based Standards
There are several arguments for introducing a consent-based approach to
statutory rape enforcement.72 Some focus on protecting offenders who can
be seen as less culpable and not deserving of unduly harsh punishment. Oth-
70. PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a)(1)(vi), 110 Stat. 2105, 2114 (1996).
71. For a complete list of state TANF plans regarding statutory rape, see Leven-Epstein,
supra note 22.
72. Of course, using the term "consent" here is somewhat misleading, because statutory rape
laws presuppose the inability of minors to legally consent to sex, making the notion of consent-
based standards to statutory rape a contradiction in terms. However, the term "consent" in a nonle-
gal context refers to a willingness on the part of the minor to engage in sex. In the following dis-
cussion, I use the word "consent" in terms of the latter sense-willingness of the minor, despite a
legal inability to consent.
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ers look to the nature of teens' capacity for meaningful consent and the need
to recognize their sexual autonomy.
1. Mitigating harsh results.
Consent-based standards are appealing because the strict application of
statutory rape laws may have surprisingly harsh effects on offenders whom
we may not view as particularly culpable or dangerous. Depending on the
specific provisions of their state's statute, offenders may face decades of
prison time73 and thousands of dollars in fines.74 These effects can be magni-
fied when connected with corollary punitive policies. For example, many
states require that an individual convicted of statutory rape register as a sex
offender. Indeed, survey data indicate that thirty-three percent of prosecutors
often push for registration as part of a defendant's punishment.75 In one
highly publicized case, an eighteen-year-old Wisconsin man who impreg-
nated his fifteen-year-old girlfriend as a result of consensual sex was con-
victed as a sex offender and required to have no contact with the girl, even
though the couple planned to marry.76 Statutory rape may also count as a
"strike" for the purposes of federal and state "three strikes" laws.77 For ex-
ample, in the SRVP Program's third year of operation, 107 defendants were
charged under California's three-strikes law, and sixty-seven received second
or third strike convictions.78 Statutory rape counts as an aggravated felony
for deportation purposes, and may be considered a "crime of violence" under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' career offender penalty enhancement
structure. 79
73. For example, in Georgia a twenty-one-year-old who has sex with a fifteen-year-old faces a
minimum of 10 and a maximum of 20 years in prison. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b) (1999).
74. For example, in California a twenty-one-year-old who has sex with a fifteen-year-old
could be fined up to $25,000. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(e)(1)(D) (West 1999).
75. A national survey of prosecutors indicates that one-third of them recommend "post-
conviction sexual offender registration with local law enforcement and/or community notification."
SHARON G. ELSTEIN AND NOY DAVIS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAW, SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS BEVEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING
THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 27 (1997) [hereinafter ABA STUDY).
76. See Annys Shin, A New Twist on an Old Law, Ms., May-June 1998, at 27.
77. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559 (West 1999) (federal statute punishing individuals with three
predicate convictions for "serious violent felonies" which includes "aggravated sexual abuse" with
life imprisonment); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c) (West 1999) (federal statute defining aggravated sexual
abuse as including statutory rape).
78. See OCJP REPORT, supra note 58 at 5.
79. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1228(a)(1) (West 1999) (authorizing the attorney general to deport ali-
ens convicted of "any criminal offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ... of this title"); id. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (including "aggravated felony" as a crime which can trigger deportation); id. §
1101(a)(43)(A) (defining "aggravated felony" to include "murder, rape or sexual abuse of a mi-
nor"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (1997) (deportation); id. § 4Bl (career
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The fact that the sex between the parties may have been "consensual"
does not mitigate these results.80 Nevertheless, while some sexual relation-
ships between adult men and teen girls are undoubtedly harmful, some un-
doubtedly are not. If a couple is engaged in a consensual relationship that is
not characterized by physical or emotional abuse, and if the girl is somewhat
mature in her decision-making ability, it is entirely possible that the relation-
ship is not injurious to her, particularly if the age difference between the two
is not very large. Many factors, discussed in the following paragraphs, indi-
cate that such unions are not inherently harmful, and that society has never
imposed a blanket prohibition on them.
Much of the culpability that society places on statutory rape offenders
stems from the perception of large age differences between the men and their
victims. Cases with truly dramatic age differences often get a great deal of
media attention and provoke justifiable outrage from the public. However,
the stereotypical statutory rape relationship, in which a man in his thirties or
forties is having sex with a girl in her early teens, does not accurately de-
scribe the majority of cases. In fact, the vast majority of men who are com-
mitting-and being prosecuted for-statutory rape, are in their teens or early
twenties. In California, 71.5% of fathers of babies born to teens are under
the age of twenty-four, and almost thirty percent are teens themselves.81
Fifty-eight percent of the defendants prosecuted through the SRVP Program
in its third year were under the age of twenty.82 Nationwide, eighty percent
of fathers of babies born to mothers aged fifteen to nineteen are less than five
years older than their partners (meaning that they are twenty-four years old
or younger).83 To the extent that legislative and enforcement efforts to "get
tough" on statutory rape are driven by the perception that much older men
are the culprits, it is important to note at the outset that the majority of these
men are actually teenagers and young adults themselves.
While most state laws prohibit unions between girls and men even a few
years older-and others prohibit unions between girls and boys of the same
offender); id. § 4B1.2 ("crime of violence" defined). For criticism of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' treatment of statutory rape for enhancement purposes, see Lewis Bossing, Now Sixteen
Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sen-
tence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205 (1998) (arguing the current model leads to inaccurate
and overly harsh results); Susan Fleischmann, Comment, Toward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statu-
tory Rape Under the United State Sentencing Guidelines, 1998 U. CGi. LEGAL. F. 425 (pushing for
a case-by-case review of recidivist enhancements for statutory rape convictions).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
statutory rape is a per se crime of violence, regardless of whether the victim consented); United
States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d
138 (8th Cir. 1992) (same).
8 1. See Shari Roan, The Invisible Men, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1995, at El (citing statistics from
the California Department of Health Services for 1993).
82. See OCJP REPORT, supra note 58, at 4.
83. See Landry & Forrest, supra note 38, at 161.
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age, in general, "the pattern of fathers being slightly older than mothers fits
squarely within societal norms."84 Research indicates that women between
twenty-one and thirty have babies with men who are, on average, three years
older than they are.85 While such age differences clearly become both more
dramatic and more problematic the younger one partner is (i.e., the three year
difference between a twenty-five-year-old woman and her twenty-eight-year-
old boyfriend, as opposed to a fourteen-year-old girl and her seventeen-year-
old boyfriend), the fact remains that such patterns are widespread in Ameri-
can culture and are likely to persist.
Developmental psychology and anecdotal evidence offer an explanation
for this trend: Simply put, young adult males are more likely to exhibit im-
mature characteristics than young adult females. The immature adult male is
not as socially adept, economically stable, or educationally developed as one
would expect from a man of his chronological age. Researchers speculate
that older men who date teens are likely to "possess developmental or psy-
chosocial deficits" which result in their having elevated high school dropout
and unemployment rates than men who are involved with women closer to
their own ages. 86 One California youth service provider describes the typical
older men her clients are involved with as follows:
Most of the guys are in what you would call a low socio-economic status-most
are poor and not well-educated. These are not college-bound guys. Basically,
most of the guys I deal with are totally immature. They are childish in their
thinking. They seem younger than they really are. They are not realistic about
relationships or parenthood.87
From a developmental standpoint, the immature twenty-year-old man may
have more in common with a mature sixteen-year-old girl than with a woman
his own age. Significantly, youth service providers indicate that such rela-
tionships are not inherently harmful to the teen, and that these immature men
often genuinely care about their girlfriends.88
84. Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Freya L. Sonenstein, Leighton Ku & Gladys Martinez, Age
Differences Between Minors Who Give Birth and Their Adult Partners, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 61,
61(1997).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 64.
87. Interview with Jenny Home, Creator and Director of the Teen Parents' Project in San
Mateo County, Redwood City, Cal. (Oct. 9, 1998) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
88. See, e.g., Interview with Erin Scott, staff attorney at Legal Advocates for Children and
Youth (LACY), in San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Scott Interview] (describing
some of the adult partners of her teen clients as "nice guy[s] who just happen[] to be older"); ABA
STUDY, supra note 75, at 11, 27 (noting that youth service providers classify some statutory rape
offenders as "nurturing" and "responsible," and prosecutors described some of the men as being in
"love relationship[s]").
.[Vol. 52:463
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 480 1999-2000
STATUTORYRAPE LAW
Marriage patterns of only a few decades ago indicate that teenage girls
commonly married and started families with older men.89 Even today, mar-
riage is a defense to statutory rape in every state.90 Finally, the ages of con-
sent vary considerably from state to state, indicating that there is little con-
sensus over the point at which a relationship becomes criminal, and implic-
itly harmful, to the girl. Hawaii places the age as low as at fourteen,91 while
California and many other states have set it as high as eighteen.92 Thus, a
twenty-year-old having sex with a fifteen-year-old in Hawaii is legally ac-
ceptable, while in California this relationship is a felony warranting severe
punishment.
Even courts and legislatures express ambivalence about the inability of
teen to consent to sex with men close to their age, and about the questionable
blameworthiness of some young offenders. The words of one California
Appeals Court opinion are telling. The court was reviewing a civil suit
brought by the parents of a sixteen-year-old girl, who had been impregnated
by her seventeen-year-old boyfriend (whom she later married), against the
boy's parents. Denying the girl's parents' claim that the boy's parents should
be held liable for his "willful misconduct," the court stated that it was "not
inclined to dwell on outdated legal fictions concerning the ability of under-
age females to consent to sex."93 The court went on to state that "[t]he fact
of the matter is that in the latter part of the 20th Century, a substantial per-
centage of minors of both sexes are engaging in sexual activity.... To cling
to vestiges of a bygone era is to ignore the contemporary realities of na-
ture."94 Similarly, in a California Senate Committee report, the Senate
Committee on Public Safety expressed some ambivalence about the culpa-
bility of statutory rape offenders. Reviewing a proposal to add statutory rape
to the list of offenses requiring mandatory sex offender registration, the
committee was concerned that:
[Wlhile technically not consensual (since minors cannot consent to sexual rela-
tions in this context), statutory rape is a non-forcible offense.... Thus, regard-
less of the circumstances, maturity or respective immaturity of the parties, a 22
year-old, for example, would be required to register for life as a sex offender
under this bill. 95
89. See Roan, supra note 81 (citing historical research which indicates that "there is nothing
new about adult men fathering the babies of teens," and suggesting that it has only become a cause
for concern because this no longer takes place in the context of marriage).
90. Of course, in order for a minor to marry, she must first either obtain the consent of a par-
ent or be legally emancipated.
91. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730(l)(b) (Michie 1998).
92. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West 1999).
93. Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94,98 n.14 (Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id.
95. SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE REPORT FOR 1997 CALIFORNIA
SENATE BILL No. 1888 (1998).
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These issues have led some commentators to suggest that judges need to
examine a variety of consent-based factors when analyzing a statutory rape
case. One argues that "[t]houghtful, self-manifested consent turns otherwise
potentially harmful acts into acts of affection and self-actualization," and that
courts should therefore consider whether or not the teen gave meaningful
consent by analyzing the nature of the relationship between the parties and
the nature of the sexual encounter.96 Another argues that "[flactors such as
the relationship between the two parties involved in the sexual act, the cir-
cumstances under which the act took place, whether physical injury oc-
curred, and who initiated the act will inform a conclusion about whether the
defendant poses a threat to the community."97 Without such an inquiry,
courts may risk imposing punishments that are wildly disproportionate to the
actual amount of harm a man has caused, or to his actual culpability.
Heidi Kitrosser argues for a system in which consent could serve as an
affirmative defense to statutory rape within certain age spans, with the re-
buttable presumption of non-consent.98 Recognizing that there are many
emotional, social, and psychological factors which may make teens more
vulnerable to coercion than adults, Kitrosser recommends that a more pro-
gressive understanding of "consent" be employed which takes these factors
into account in order to assure that the teen's consent is truly meaningful.99
Consent-based arguments have understandably met with opposition.
First, some argue that women of all ages are already vulnerable to sexual
violence and oppression, and that laws against forcible rape are already in-
adequate to protect them. Evidentiary rules which require a showing of
force, sexist juror attitudes, and the emotional difficulty of going through a
rape trial all work to prevent the legal system from meeting the needs of vic-
tims of forcible rape.00 Often, victims of statutory rape have been victims of
a more-difficult-to-prove forcible rape as well.O1 With statutory rape avail-
96. Bossing, supra note 79, at 1250. See also Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a
New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287,289 (1997) ("[l]t is far too
simplistic to suggest that adolescent girls are incapable of making consensual sexual choices in all
instances."); Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Four-
teenth Amendment, and Protecting Women From Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1933,
1992 (1992) ("Although the feminist concern that young women are being forced into sex before
they are ready is legitimate, the answer does not lie in laws that punish young men who engage in
consensual acts.").
97. Fleischmann, supra note 79, at 426.
98. See Kitrosser, supra note 96, at 330-33.
99. See id. at 333.
100. Cf Oberman, supra note 4, at 37 (describing how statutory rape laws enable prosecutors
to obtain convictions in cases where there is insufficient evidence of non consent to sustain a forci-
ble rape charge).
101. Interestingly, it seems clear that the victim in Michael M. was actually the victim of
forcible rape. See 450 U.S. 464, 483 n.* (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing portions of the
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able to them, prosecutors may be able to obtain a conviction quickly, with a
minimum amount of participation by the victim. Introducing a consent-
based standard into the analysis would create the same problems for victims
and prosecutors as those seen in forcible rape cases, and may open victims
up to the same distasteful attacks on character, behavior, and chastity that
forcible rape victims frequently face.
Furthermore, because of complicated social and psychological forces,
consent may be rendered a meaningless concept as it applies to teen girls, or
at least one too complex and problematic for juries to decide.102 Recent
studies indicate that some teen girls suffer from very high levels of debili-
tatingly low self-esteem, engage in risky and self-destructive behavior in or-
der to gain social acceptance, and are extremely vulnerable to the sexual co-
ercion of older boys and men.103 These girls may thus engage in apparently
consensual sexual activity that is both dangerous and demoralizing, because
they are operating within a constrained and warped system of options.04
Introducing a consent standard here would mean treating uniquely vulnerable
teen girls like fully-matured women, and would make it difficult to protect
girls against subtle sexual coercion by adults.
While these arguments have some force, it is important to note that none
suggest that all teen girls are incapable of giving meaningful consent.
Rather, they seem to focus on the difficulty of determining which girls need
protection and which may not, and the danger that anything less than a
bright-line rule leaves the ones who do need protection at risk. The fact re-
mains that meaningful consent is possible for teens, and that this profoundly
influences the nature of the statutory rape relationship.
trial court transcript in which the victim testified that she told the defendant to stop his sexual ad-
vances, that he hit her in the face, and that she sustained bruises). Nonetheless, the State prose-
cuted-and the Court regarded-the case as one ofconsensual statutory rape, not forcible rape. See
id. at 466.
102. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 68-70 (arguing that a consent-based model fails to take
the vulnerabilities of adolescent girls into consideration).
103. See generally e.g., PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOLGIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM,
AND THE CONFIDENCE GAP 51-66 (1994) (describing the difficulties that girls have in developing
healthy, autonomous sexual attitudes in a climate of hostility, peer pressure, and double standards);
MARY PEPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS (1994) (discuss-
ing the pressures society places upon adolescent girls and the deleterious effects observed).
104. Oberman illustrates this point with the example of the infamous Los Angeles "Spur
Posse" gang of 1993. Older, popular boys preyed on their younger classmates, subjecting them to
humiliating sexual episodes. The boys set up a scoring system for their sexual conquests, and later
referred to their victims as "Whores." Despite the degrading nature of many of the encounters, the
prosecutor determined that they were technically "consensual," and for that reason declined to
prosecute the gang members for statutory rape. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 15-18.
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2. Victim empowerment.
The aggressive prosecution of statutory rape cases where the teen victim
both consented to the activity and is mature enough to give meaningful con-
sent deprives the girl of control over her own sexual autonomy. Further-
more, the way cases are handled further deprives the teen of control over
events which may have a significant impact on her life. Most teens are re-
luctant to see their older boyfriends prosecuted. While every jurisdiction and
district attorney's office has a different policy on the matter, the general con-
sensus is that the teen victim's wishes about whether to move forward with a
statutory rape prosecution have little bearing on what actually happens. A
national survey of prosecutors indicates that only one-third say they are "al-
ways or almost always successful in overcoming the girl's reluctance" to
prosecute.10s Of course, it may be difficult for a case to go forward without
the victim's cooperation. However, when a child or pregnancy has resulted,
prosecutors have all of the proof they need, and it is much more likely that
they will move forward regardless of the victim's wishes.106 One advocate
for teens describes the process as "really agenda driven.... [t]he whole ex-
perience is NOT empowering for them. I would almost say that the whole
process amounts to a revictimization of the teen."107
Teens may also have the upsetting experience of being forced to testify
about their sexual activity in court, or be questioned about it by police, in-
vestigators, or prosecutors. In lives which are already filled with difficulty,
chaos, and poverty, a prosecution may cause even more turmoil. In the
words of one teen parent:
[Prosecution] causes more problems than what's necessary. That means [my
boyfriends is] going to be dragged to court, then I'm probably going to have to
come in or say something to somebody and then it's going to go on for months
and months and months. And that's going to cause more complications in my
life.108
Prosecuting men for statutory rape when the parties were in a con-
sensual relationship-and particularly when they have a baby-can
cause the teens emotional trauma. Moreover, prosecutors are unlikely to
be in a position to help teens deal with the long-term impact that the
prosecution will have on their lives. One advocate complains:
105. ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 26.
106. See id. (finding that close to one-half of prosecutors say that pregnancy provides them
with evidence of the illegal sex, and makes it easier for them to prosecute cases involving an unco-
operative victim).
107. Scott Interview, supra note 88 (emphasis in original).
108. ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 38.
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The DA's Office basically comes in, tells the girls they are victims, does a
"surgical strike" by prosecuting .... And then the DA's Office is out of the
picture. Does this really serve these girls for the rest of their lives? There is
nobody there to help the girl deal with the consequences that the whole experi-
ence is going to have on her child. I mean, what is she supposed to tell her kid,
"Daddy went to jail because you were born"? ... No one stays around to help
the girl figure out the role that the dad is going to play in the child's life .... 109
As a result of these difficulties, commentators have suggested that
statutory rape laws be amended to give minors greater control over the
prosecution decision. Frances Olsen proposes an enforcement structure that
would either "permit charges to be brought only upon the [minor's] com-
plaint or require that they be dropped upon her request."110 She argues that
such an enforcement model would reduce the negative and repressive aspects
of statutory rape laws without leaving teens wholly unprotected.,t1
Opponents of giving teens greater control over the prosecution decision
also contend that this merely gives statutory rapists an opportunity to coerce
their victims into not cooperating with the authorities. Additionally, giving
teens greater control runs counter to the predominant assumption underlying
statutory rape law in the first place, namely that teens are incapable of ren-
dering such judgments. Indeed, if teens are considered too immature to con-
sent to sex, it is unlikely that they will be seen as mature enough to make
decisions about prosecution. Finally, in any criminal prosecution, the state,
not the victim, is technically the party to the case. While an individual vic-
tim may wish to have a case dismissed, society still has an interest in pun-
ishing lawbreakers.112
The analytical difficulty with introducing a consent standard and victim
empowerment into statutory rape law ultimately centers on the gray area
between consent and coercion in which many teen sexual encounters take
place.13 This is compounded by another gray area: the continuum between
childhood and adulthood that all teens move across at varying speeds. Every
teen and every sexual encounter is different. However, the law currently
makes broad generalizations about the maturity of teens and their ability to
make decisions about sexuality, despite the fact that any one teen or sexual
encounter might not fit into the model. Thus, statutory rape is one of the few
strict-liability criminal offenses in contemporary American law, with an age
109. Scott Interview, supra note 88.
110. Olsen, supra note 6, at 408 (footnote omitted).
Ill. See id.
112. For an example of this argument as it applies to domestic violence, see Machaela M.
Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Ar-
rest in California, 85 CAL. L. Rv. 643, 648 (1997) ("By making domestic violence a crime against
the state, mandatory arrest will take the criminal justice system's focus off the victim and place it
where it belongs-on the person who has violated the laws .... ").
113. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 6, at 427 ("[T]hese two categories constitute a continuum of
sexual relations; there is no bright line between them.").
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cut-off which cannot countenance the mitigating influence of consent. The
harsher the penalties for statutory rape become, and the higher states set their
ages of consent, the more this model may call out for revision.
B. Substantive Due Process
The personal issues surrounding statutory rape-particularly when it re-
sults in a pregnancy-are numerous. A teen may be making choices about
sex, contraceptive use, abortion, childbearing, child rearing, and the nature of
her continued relationship with the man. Of course, as the data indicate, not
all teens are making free and informed decisions in these areas. But some
undoubtedly are. Thus, it is worth exploring how personal privacy and sub-
stantive due process rights factor in to the situation. I focus in this analysis
on relationships which are "consensual"--meaning willingly entered into by
the teen and lacking in any physical, sexual, or emotional abuse. In such
situations, the teen's privacy rights, while limited, still exist. Furthermore, in
situations where the statutory rape has resulted in pregnancy, the teen has
many substantive due process rights connected to the pregnancy and child.
In fact, the father may also have rights connected to the child, although this
argument is more difficult to make.
1. Privacy in making sexual decisions.
The issue of privacy arises whenever the law affects deeply personal ar-
eas such as sexual activity and procreative decision-making. While it is true
that minors are subject to more restrictive state control than adults, they also
retain certain rights of privacy and decisional autonomy. Some of these
rights are articulated in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on abortion and
contraception, as well as in the so-called "mature minor" provisions in state
laws governing access to medical care. For example, in Carey v. Population
Services International, the Court held that minors have a right to privacy in
procreational matters, and that they must be permitted to obtain contracep-
tives without parental consent.1 4 In Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth, the Court found unconstitutional a state requirement that
minors obtain the consent of a parent before seeking an abortion.115 The
Court later declared in Bellotti v. Baird that states which required parental
consent could only do so if they also provided a judicial bypass mecha-
nism.11 6 This device would permit the minor to go before a judge and either
demonstrate her maturity to make the decision, or argue that, despite her lack
114. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
115. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
116. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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of maturity, the procedure would be in her best interest.117 In addition, all
the states have laws that permit minors to consent to receive care for sexually
transmitted diseases and many also allow minors to consent to treatment for
alcohol and substance abuse and psychiatric care.118 These laws and deci-
sions indicate that, even for minors, there are areas of sexuality, health, and
reproduction which are too private to warrant state interference.'19
While no court has found that minors have the privacy right to engage in
sex with adults, some state courts have reached opposing results when ad-
dressing the privacy right of minors to engage in consensual sexual activity
with one another. For example, in People v. TA.J., a California appellate
court upheld the misdemeanor conviction of a sixteen-year-old boy accused
of having sex with a fourteen-year-old girl.120 The court rejected the boy's
argument that, as a juvenile who was intended to be protected by the statute,
he could not be charged under it.121 More significantly, the court ruled that,
despite the fact that minors have privacy rights under California's constitu-
tion-and regardless of the fact that many teenagers are sexually active-
minors in California do not have a constitutionally protected right of privacy
to engage in sexual intercourse.122
In contrast, in B.B. v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that minors
do have a privacy right to engage in consensual sex, and that, although the
state has a compelling state interest in regulating the activity, criminal sanc-
tions were not the least intrusive means of doing so.12 3 Under challenge by a
sixteen-year-old boy convicted of a felony for engaging in consensual sex
with a 16-year old girl, the court reasoned that intimate personal activities
such as marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and family relation-
ships were protected privacy rights. The court found that, while the state has
a compelling interest in controlling these activities as they relate to minors,
sexual activity does fall generally within the zone of minors' privacy rights.
The state argued that its ban on sex between minors was a "shield" that
would protect them, but the court found that the law was actually being used
as a "weapon" against them.124 The court ultimately determined that a crimi-
nal statute (making this behavior a second-degree felony) was not the least
intrusive means necessary to achieve the state's interest.
117. See id. at 643-44.
118. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 48-50 (surveying a variety of "mature minor" laws).
119. See id. at 47 (arguing that the privacy rights of minors are not necessarily driven by the
"sense that minors are mature enough to make such decisions, but rather, by a belief that certain
forms of treatment are so important that the law should facilitate access to them").
120. 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331 (Ct. App. 1998).
121. See id. at 339-41.
122. See id. at 338.
123. 659 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 1995).
124. Id. at260.
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Only one court has gone so far as to suggest that minors have a privacy
right to engage in sexual activity with adults, and vice versa. In 1992, a
Florida trial court dismissed statutory rape charges against two men because
it found that the law violated the provisions for privacy in the state's consti-
tution.125 This decision was later overruled in Jones v. State, in which the
state's court of appeals held that the privacy rationale does not give minors
the right to consent to sexual intercourse with adults.126
While it is important to consider the privacy rights of teens, it is equally
important to recognize that privacy as a concept exists within a preexisting
normative framework which may privilege a white, middle-class family
structure, and may differentially affect women of color. For example, mi-
nority women may feel a greater need to protect their partners from a law
enforcement apparatus that may seem racist and oppressive. Indeed, one
commentator points out that, in the context of domestic violence, "[t]he con-
ceptualization of privacy ... and its implications for women in the family,
are different for Black women than for white women, because the potential
for state intervention and governmental coercion into the private sphere of
the family is of greater concern for Black women than for white women."127
In addition, cultural practices regarding patterns of sexuality and family
structures may vary across racial and ethnic lines. For example, experts who
work in the Latino community recognize that Latino culture condones rela-
tionships between girls and older men.1 28 The director of a family health
center in Santa Ana, California notes that, "[iln Latino culture it is very ac-
ceptable to be sexually active at 12 or 13 .... Usually, what we will see is a
16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old boy. Often they are cohabiting, and the
parents approve. This is a culturally acceptable thing."129 Particularly in
California, where many people emigrate from South America, Central
America, and Mexico, some couples arrive only to find that their relation-
125. See Mike Clary, Should a Minor Have the Right to Say Yes?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15,
1992, at 3 (discussing the case).
126. 619 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), af'd, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
127. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race
and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 185 (1994). Kimberle
Crenshaw also discusses the differential impact of laws and policies on women of color in her
writings on "intersectionality." See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersection-
ality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (in-
vestigating violence against women of color through the lenses of race and gender).
128. See Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective in Preventing Adolescent
Pregnancy?, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 30, 33 (1997) ("Providers also point out that in some cultures it
is accepted, even encouraged, for young girls to have relationships with much older men.").
129. Leslie de la Flor, quoted in Matt Lait & Dexter Filkins, Views on Statutory Rape Aren't
as Clear-Cut as Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al.
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ships are criminal.30 This note does not argue that cultural relativism should
excuse potentially harmful behaviors.131 Rather, it merely points out that
these practices may be more concentrated in a particular culture and thus
may have greater potential for implicating the privacy rights of those in-
volved.
Of course, as many feminists have noted, privacy can be a double-edged
sword for women. 32 While aggressive and inflexible statutory rape prose-
cution may subject teens to an untoward level of state control, the failure to
enforce statutory rape laws in the name of privacy may also leave teens vul-
nerable to exploitation.133 As Francis Olsen observes, "[e]very effort to pro-
tect young women against private oppression by individual men risks sub-
jecting women to state oppression, and every effort to protect them against
state oppression undermines their power to resist individual oppression."134
Thus, the degree to which teens' privacy interests should be taken into
account is unclear. However, we can reach a few conclusions: teens have
some right to make personal decisions regarding sexuality and pregnancy;
there are many sensitive issues involved, including cultural practices and
community differences; and there are risks inherent both in too much in-
fringement on privacy rights and in too much deference to them.
2. Parental rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated, in a long line of cases, significant
substantive due process interests in parenting and child rearing.35 Obvi-
130. See Matt Lait, Agency Helps Some Girls Wed Men Who Impregnated Them, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1996, at Al (describing how Latina girls and their families sometimes "enlist the help of
the Mexican Consulate to get married"). For example, Erin Scott of LACY describes a couple who
were married in an unofficial ceremony in a remote village in Mexico and then immigrated to the
United States. Authorities were notified about the couple because the girl was a minor and there
was a large age difference between them. The man was charged with statutory rape and threatened
with deportation. The couple had to rush to the Mexican Consulate in order to make the marriage
official before his court date. See Scott Interview, supra note 88.
131. See Lait, supra note 130 (quoting a social worker who argues that condoning such rela-
tionships "smacks of racism and sexism" and that "the justification for allowing [girls] to continue
to be abused is that it is 'cultural").
132. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 6, at 390 ("Some feminists focus on the sexist nature of so-
cial control and assert that in practice it means social control of women. Other feminists focus on
the sexist nature of sexual freedom and point out that freedom means freedom for men to exploit
women.").
133. See, e.g., Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991) ("[S]exual exploitation of
children is a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed behind the zone of pri-
vacy that normally shields the home.").
134. Olsen, supra note 6, at 412.
135. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("The intangible fibers that con-
nect parent and child ... are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate
cases."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing the rights of parents to direct their
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ously, these interests are distinct from the issue of criminal liability for intra-
family acts. A family member who commits a crime against another family
member may or may not be deprived of his or her parental rights, depending
on a variety of factors.136 However, in the case of statutory rape, where the
offense itself produces the parental relationship, the issues become murlder.
Both parties have some degree of parental and familial rights which should
be considered in an analysis of the appropriate legal response to the statutory
rape. 137
If the statutory rape has resulted in a child, the teen's rights are clear. As
long as she is capable of being an adequate caregiver, she is allowed to retain
custody of her child and raise it as she sees fit. Concomitant with her paren-
tal responsibilities, the teen mother acquires a host of rights regarding her
child, which include the decisional autonomy to direct the child's education,
upbringing, and religious training. It is not such a stretch to argue that the
custodial mother--even though she is a teen-should also have some say in
the role that the child's father will play in her life and in the life of their child
(cabined, of course, by his own rights to make these decisions).
The parental rights potentially retained by the adult father are more am-
biguous. An analysis of several cases indicates that these rights hinge on the
nature of the relationship between the father and child and on the purposes
for which the father is asserting his rights. For example, in In re Adoption of
Michael H., the California Court of Appeals found that a man who conceived
a child in the course of a statutory rape should not lose his parental rights to
the child as a result.138 For the court, the decision turned on whether or not
the intercourse was consensual. The court determined that it had been, and
ruled that the fact that the man had committed statutory rape was not alone
enough to terminate his parental rights to the child, who had been placed for
adoption.39 The California Supreme Court ultimately terminated the man's
parental rights, not because of the statutory rape, but because it determined
children's upbringing and religious training); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (up-
bringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (education).
136. The term "parental rights" encompasses a variety of rights, including legal and physical
custody, visitation, and the mere ability to claim the existence of a legal, filial relationship.
137. The following discussion and examples focus on parental relationships created by "con-
sensual" intercourse, see supra note 72, and are in no way intended to support the proposition that a
man who fathers a child through non-consensual intercourse (i.e., rape) should have any parental
rights to his offspring.
138. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 264-65 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
445 (1995).
139. See id.; see also Craig V. v. Mia W., 116 A.D.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding
that a father who had committed statutory rape was not precluded from bringing a paternity pro-
ceeding, because the state law only barred a paternity petition if the man had committed rape by
forcible compulsion).
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that he had not demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibili-
ties and that the child would be better off in the adoptive family.140
Similarly, in Doe v. Brown, the South Carolina Supreme Court found
that a seventeen-year-old man who impregnated a twelve-year-old girl was
not precluded from the right to notice and consent when the child was placed
for adoption simply because he was guilty of statutory rape. 141 Specifically,
the court found that "public policy is served by recognizing a legal relation-
ship, albeit limited, between the 'criminal parent' and the child," when the
father has undertaken to support the child. 142 However, the court denied the
man's paternity rights because it found that he had failed to undertake finan-
cial or other parental responsibilities.143
Pefia v. Mattox involved a man who had conceived a child through
statutory rape and was arrested and prosecuted for the crime.44 While he
was in jail, and unbeknownst to him, his girlfriend delivered the baby, which
was put up for adoption. Eighteen months later, he filed a civil rights claim
against the prosecutor and the judge, claiming damages for the deprivation of
his parental rights. The Seventh Circuit denied his claims, stating that the
plaintiff had committed a serious crime, and "should not be rewarded ... by
receiving parental rights which he may be able to swap for the agreement of
the victim's family not to press criminal charges."145 One important factor in
the court's decision was its finding that the man had not established any re-
lationship with his child. Indeed, the man was not seeking to establish the
right to have a relationship with the child-he was merely seeking damages
for the fact that the adoption had taken place without his consent. Signifi-
cantly, Judge Posner recognized that the existence of a relationship between
father and son (beyond the merely genetic) might have altered the outcome,
stating that "[a] statutory rapist who has managed somehow to establish a
relationship with his child... may have a claim to parental rights."46
A few courts, however, have found that a man's parental rights may be
terminated, regardless of his subsequent behavior regarding the child, on the
basis of the statutory rape. In Christian Child Placement Service v. Vestal,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied a man's challenge to a statute
which denied parental rights to individuals convicted of sexual abuse. 147 The
140. See 898 P.2d 891, 901 (Cal. 1995).
141. 489 S.E.2d 917 (S.C. 1997).
142. Id. at 920; see also In re Michael P., 1997 WL 816183, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 19,
1997) (terminating parental rights of a man who had been incarcerated on a statutory rape convic-
tion because he had "failed to support [the] child or [to] manifest any reasonable parental interest").
143. See Doe v. Brown, 489 S.E.2d at 921.
144. 84 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996).
145. Id. at 900.
146. Id. at 901.
147. 962 P.2d 1261, 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
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court found that the statute at issue was rationally related to the state's inter-
est in protecting children from sexual exploitation and ordered the child
placed for adoption.148
It is important to note that many of the above-discussed cases involved
fact-specific inquiries into the nature (or lack) of a parenting relationship.
Almost all of the cases which deal with this issue imply that a father who has
committed statutory rape may retain parental rights if he establishes either an
emotional or financial relationship with his child. It is also relevant that all
of the men in these cases were seeking to assert their parental rights in the
context of complete family breakdown. These cases all arose in situations in
which the man no longer had a relationship with the child's mother. In fact,
in all of these cases, the girl herself had relinquished her rights to the child,
and the child had either been placed in foster care or adopted. In each case,
granting the man parental rights would have interfered with the child's being
placed into a more stable home.
Thus, it seems fairly clear that a father who has committed statutory rape
can lose his paternal rights-like any father-if he fails to establish a rela-
tionship with the child. This is especially likely if the child has already been
placed in an adoptive or foster home. However, there are very few judicial
pronouncements that a man should lose parental rights automatically based
on the fact that the child was conceived as the result of a statutory rape. This
may be based on the importance of the right at stake: Parental rights are an
enduring and significant component of substantive due process. However, it
is more likely due to the notion that recognizing paternal involvement-ei-
ther emotional or financial-may be in the best interests of the child. The
Supreme Court has yet to clarify the issue.
C. The Family and Practicality
Stepping back from a rights-based analysis, it is also important to look at
statutory rape through the analytical framework of family needs. This Part is
concerned exclusively with statutory rape cases in which a pregnancy and
childbirth have resulted, and thus a "family" has been formed. While many
people object to the notion that a crime such as statutory rape can create a
family,149 this reaction should not prevent policymakers from taking a hard
look at the impact of "get tough" policies on the interests of individual teens
and their offspring. If the primary motivation for cracking down on statutory
148. See id.; see also Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 500 N.W.2d 649 (Wis. 1993) (holding that a state
statute denying a man convicted of statutory rape the opportunity to contest a petition to terminate
his parental rights did not violate his due process or equal protection rights).
149. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 48 (decrying attempts to "make ... a family out of a fel-
ony").
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rape is the well-being of pregnant and parenting teens,15 0 it follows that we
should analyze the effect that "get tough" policies actually have on them.
It is important to note at the outset that pregnancy and childbirth usually
signal cases in which prosecutors, law enforcement, and legislators are more
likely to "get tough" on statutory rape. Some prosecutors' offices have
stated policies of pursuing only those cases of statutory rape in which a preg-
nancy has occurred, because such cases are viewed as more serious. For ex-
ample, some California counties administering the Statutory Rape Vertical
Prosecution (SRVP) Program, such as San Diego, only accept cases for
prosecution when there is both a large age difference between the parties and
a pregnancy has resulted.151 Riverside County District Attorney Dennis
Stout says that most of his office's statutory rape cases involve a pregnancy,
because the SRVP Program grants "were intended as a way to crack down on
teen pregnancy."152 Some state laws contain stricter penalties for statutory
rapes that result in pregnancies.153 Finally, most low-income teens who get
pregnant become involved with social services, which then triggers reporting
requirements, making it more likely that the case will be brought to the at-
tention of authorities. In the SRVP Program's third year, fifty-seven percent
of the statutory rape cases filed involved a pregnancy.15 4
If our only concern were punishing the adult, then such policies would
not be problematic. However, if the victim is a new mother she may rely on
the man or his family for monetary assistance, housing, emotional support,
child care, or in-kind support. 55 Research indicates that a greater number of
statutory rape offenders seek to take responsibility for their families than
popularly believed. One large-scale study of parenting minors with adult
partners found that thirty-five percent had been cohabiting during the preg-
nancy, and forty-nine percent were living with their partner up to thirty
months after the birth.56 While these relationships may not last longer than
a few years, they may span the most "difficult" period for the girl-when she
is still relatively young and her baby is an infant. And some of these rela-
tionships may actually work in the long term, with the age difference be-
150. This assumption is called into question in Part V.
151. See Donovan, supra note 128, at 33 (noting that the San Diego District Attorney's Office
only prosecutes cases "in which a pregnancy has occurred and the man is at least six years older
than the underage woman").
152. Tina Dirmann, Sex Crimes: Special Target, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside,
CA), July 3, 1997, atBl.
153. See notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text.
154. See OCJP REPORT, supra note 58, at 4.
155. See Donovan, supra note 128, at 34 (noting that young mothers often receive crucial
cash and in-kind support from their children's fathers, and quoting one advocate as saying "I don't
see where it's human logic or nature that would motivate her to send that father to jail").
156. See Lindberg et. al., supra note 84, at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
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coming less noticeable and problematic as the parties grow older.157 The
director of one teen clinic sums the dilemma up well: "Adult [men] impreg-
nating teenage girls is a troublesome phenomenon that is ... unacceptable,
... but we have to be very careful here .... We're talking about someone
who has a baby to raise, and she needs resources to help raise that baby and
she needs a father to help raise that baby."158 Prosecutors, however, may still
intervene. One national survey found that nearly one-fourth of prosecutors
would pursue charges against the male even if he were willing to acknowl-
edge paternity and accept responsibility.159
Parenting teens often have troubled backgrounds and unstable family
situations, meaning that the typical statutory rape victim may not have many
other avenues of support in raising her child. Close to one-half of youth
service providers surveyed nationally responded that the families and homes
of their pregnant and parenting teen clients are in disarray.160 Typical situa-
tions involved the teen girl living "with extended family members, with a
variety of relatives and half- or step-relatives, in a foster care situation (either
a home or a residential center), with her boyfriend, or with her boyfriend and
his family."16, They further indicated that their clients are often faced with
"[f]amilial breakdown, lack of a stable father-figure, economic disadvantage,
abuse, neglect, and an intergenerational history of teen pregnancy."162
In the face of these difficult realities, it may actually make sense for a
teen to remain in a relationship with her older partner-provided, of course,
that he is not abusive and is willing to help support her. Social service and
law enforcement agencies have a hard time reconciling these cases with a
strong punitive approach to statutory rape. For example, during a two-year
period after the implementation of California's SRVP Program, Orange
County social workers made recommendations to juvenile court judges that
at least fifteen pregnant and parenting teens under their supervision be per-
mitted to marry or resume living with their adult male partners.163 One of the
most controversial of these unions was the marriage of a pregnant thirteen-
year-old and her twenty-year-old boyfriend. Social workers recommended
157. See, e.g., Matt Lait, Living Proof That Teen-Adult Marriage Can Work, L.A. TiMrs,
Sept. 29, 1996, at Al (reporting on a loving and financially stable family that began when the girl
was sixteen and the man was twenty-one, and noting that the couple's marriage had lasted thirteen
years).
158. Lois Salisbury, Executive Director of Children Now, quoted in Donovan, supra note
151, at 34.
159. See ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 26. The survey did not indicate the type of responsi-
bility-financial, emotional, or both.
160. See id. at 10.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 12.
163. See Lait, supra note 130.
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that the two be allowed to wed when they learned that the girl had been a
drug abuser and had associated with gang members before going to live with
the man, and that he supported her and planned to help raise their child.64
This policy sparked tremendous controversy when it became public.
One commentator argued that the policy was equivalent to reintroducing a
marital rape exemption into the law and that it allowed teens to be sexually
victimized under the auspices of a legally sanctioned marriage.165 The head
of California's Department of Social Services called on the officials to end
the policy, arguing that girls should be separated from the men who impreg-
nate them, be given intensive counseling, and be encouraged to give their
babies up for adoption. As for the men, she argued that they should be incar-
cerated if they failed to provide for the infant.166 An attorney who special-
izes in these matters counter-argued:
Unfortunately, the people who are saying [it's wrong in every case] don't have
to live with the aftermath .... It's like cutting off your nose to spite your face.
What if the guy wants to do what's right, and that is to marry the girl? ... At
some point we have to make that trade-off, between our principles and what's
right for society at large.167
Even a spokesman for the Governor was forced to admit that "[t]his is a
complicated issue. We may have to weigh the positives of a prosecution
with disuniting the male figure from a functioning family."168 Ultimately,
the policy of social workers recommending marriage to juvenile court judges
was ordered to be discontinued, although the judges can still rule independ-
ently to allow such unions.169
Whether or not the couple is given permission to marry, the potentially
harsh punishments that an offender faces if convicted of statutory rape may
make it extremely difficult for him to contribute financially or emotionally to
the well-being of his family. If the man is imprisoned or deported-either
because of the statutory rape itself or because of the corollary punitive poli-
cies that statutory rape prosecution entails-it is very unlikely that he will be
able to contribute to his family. Even if he is released, or serves no time, a
felony conviction on his record makes it harder to get a job, particularly if
the man is a registered sex offender. A legal advocate for teens notes that:
164. See Matt Lait & Lee Romney, She's 13, He's 20; Is It Love or Is It Abuse?, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1996, at Al.
165. See Kelly C. Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The
Victimization of Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REv. 237,240 (1997).
166. See Matt Lait, Teen-Adult Weddings Draw More Criticism, L.A. TIMES (Orange Cty.
Ed.), Sept. 11, 1996, at Al (citing comments by Eloise Anderson).
167. Jess Araujo, quoted in Matt Lait, O.C. Teen Wedding Policy Raises Stir, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1996, atAl.
168. Sean Walsh, quoted in id.
169. See Matt Lait, O.C. Agency Alters Policy on Underage Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1997, at Al.
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A big [problem] is that the guy gets locked up and there goes [the teen's] child
support. Not just while he's in jail but after he gets out. A lot of these guys
aren't in the running for great jobs anyway, but with a felony conviction it's
almost impossible for even the most motivated ones to get good jobs.... A
guy's job prospects just plummet when he has a felony conviction on his rec-
ord."17 0
Finally, in light of the fact that prosecutors almost always recommend that
the male stay away from the girl, it will be difficult for a man who wants to
spend time with his offspring and contribute child care, housing, or other
support, to do so. 1 71
Supporters of "get tough" policies make several arguments against en-
couraging such male involvement. They claim that the men are not very
good providers anyway, due to their immaturity. Furthermore, they argue
that a man who would commit statutory rape is a bad influence on the girl
and her offspring, and that he should not be rewarded for his conduct by be-
coming part of the family. These arguments have some resonance, but only
if we assume that the relationship is abusive or exploitative, or that the girl
does not want the man to assist her. If the girl wants and depends on the
man's involvement, if he is willing to be involved, and if the relationship is
not harmful to the girl, it becomes more difficult to justify criminal sanc-
tions. The man is being asked not merely to reap the intangible benefits of
having a new family, but also to shoulder burdens and responsibilities as
well. This should carry some weight, particularly given the origins of the
"get tough" policies in a welfare reform bill that was concerned with encour-
aging two-parent families and fostering paternal responsibility.
D. A Modest Proposal
The previous parts discuss the difficulties posed by teens' uncertain ca-
pacity to consent to sexual relationships, their privacy and parental rights,
and the economic and social realities that many teen parents face when trying
to raise their children. Several points become clear in this analysis. First, the
area of statutory rape enforcement is fraught with analytical difficulties. On
the one hand, teens as a group are more vulnerable to exploitation than
adults, in need of more protection at the expense of privacy, and less capable
of making mature reproductive decisions. On the other hand, some teens are
capable of giving meaningful consent to sexual activity, and their decisions
170. Scott Interview, supra note 88. Scott describes one case in which a man was convicted
of statutory rape after impregnating his girlfriend. Although the couple lived together, and the man
intended to support his new family, the conviction prevented him from ever getting a job in his
field-teaching. See id.
171. See ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 27 (reporting that 100% of prosecutors surveyed rec-
ommended to the judge that the defendant have no contact with the victim).
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for dealing with the consequences are protected by their right to privacy.
Furthermore, many teens are already pregnant and/or parenting. For them,
abstract notions of privacy and protection become comparatively unimpor-
tant in light of their very "adult" concerns about how best to provide for their
children. Another point which emerges in this analysis is that aggressive,
one-size-fits-all strategies for enforcing statutory rape laws may sometimes
be detrimental-to teens and to their children.
This analysis therefore leads to a conclusion that is, in many ways, in
opposition to the current trend in statutory rape enforcement law and policy:
While current enforcement efforts are targeted toward situations in which the
statutory rape has resulted in a pregnancy, these are in fact the precise cases
in which law enforcement must tread most lightly. Once a child has been
introduced into the picture, the teen's rights of personal and familial privacy
become heightened. As a mother, she is no longer in the childlike position in
which state intervention is completely warranted and beneficial; while she
may still be in need of protection, she must also make many adult deci-
sions.172 And while there are definitely situations in which criminal en-
forcement is appropriate, there are also those in which it is not. As a former
domestic violence prosecutor observes, "we are often left in the untenable
position of arguing that the state should only intervene in women's lives
when it is 'good' for them and stay out when it is 'bad."'13
As the previous discussion makes clear, there are dangers in making a
wholesale legislative shift towards incorporating victim consent into the cal-
culus of statutory rape: Teens may be left more vulnerable to forcible rape
and coercive sex; a consent defense may invite unwarranted scrutiny of the
victim's character and conduct. In light of this, the more appropriate avenue
for reform lies in the methods in which these cases are prosecuted.
Prosecutors have two broad ways of influencing the disposition of a case.
First, they can decide whether to charge the offender at all, and second, they
can make sentencing recommendations to the judge. Nationally, close to
one-half of prosecutors surveyed say that they "always" or "almost always"
file charges when a statutory rape case is referred to them from law enforce-
ment.174 Specialized prosecution units, such as those in California and Con-
necticut, may file charges even more frequently. Currently, many prosecu-
tors in California's SRVP Program charge the majority of offenders who
172. For an interesting discussion of the dual role and status of teen parents, see Diana M.
Pearce, "Children Having Children". Teenage Pregnancy and Public Policy from the Woman's
Perspective, in THE POLITICs OF PREGNANCY 46, 46-58 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode
eds., 1993) (criticizing policies which overly infantilize young mothers by restricting their abilities
to make decisions and operate their households).
173. Cheryl Hanna, No Right To Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1872 (1996).
174. ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 26.
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come to their attention and then rely on the sentencing phase to achieve indi-
vidualized results.175 However, as discussed above, the many negative cor-
ollary effects of a criminal-particularly a felony-conviction (e.g., deporta-
tion, a criminal record, sex offender registration, "strikes") may be very seri-
ous, even if the sentence is relatively light. Therefore, I recommend that, at
least when a pregnancy is involved, all prosecutors' offices should develop
flexible team-oriented charging policies, which involve making an initial
determination at the investigative stage of the case, and which may result in
charges not being brought at all.176
The American Bar Association observes that prosecutors consider vari-
ables such as "the maturity levels of the girl and the man, whether the prose-
cution is in the best interests of the girl and/or her offspring, and whether the
male has engaged in these relationships serially."177 More specifically, I rec-
ommend that, in making a charging decision, prosecutors should: 1) exam-
ine the offender, including his relationship with the girl, his willingness to
support or care for the child, and whether or not he has a criminal record or
prior history of statutory rape; and 2) consult social workers who may be
familiar with the girl and her family situation. The involvement of social
workers is important, because they often have a more complete understand-
ing of the girl's situation and are in a better position to evaluate the impact
that a prosecution would have on her.178 Evidence indicates that social
workers are much less likely to see criminal intervention as the solution. A
nationwide survey of youth service providers found that only one in five
thought holding males accountable through prosecution was an appropriate
response.179
Prosecutors, victim advocates, and social workers should also focus on
the longer-term well-being of the victim and her offspring by involving the
victim in the process. The teen should be counseled by a victim advocate
working in conjunction with the teen's social worker to set up a plan for
handling the case. The team could analyze what the teen's living situation
175. See Telephone Interview with Joanne McCracken, Deputy District Attorney for Santa
Clara County, Cal. (Oct. 2, 1998); Telephone Interview with Nancy O'Malley, Senior Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney for Alameda County, Cal. and Project Director for the SRVP (Oct. 9, 1998).
176. The policies of different prosecutors' offices vary, and some may have adopted many or
all of these suggestions. (The author does not know of any offices that have adopted all of them.)
177. ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 25.
178. For a more thorough discussion of the ways in which social workers can assist lawyers in
relating to their clients and thereby improve the delivery of legal services to these clients, see Paula
Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Reexamining the Nature and Po-
tential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2123 (1999).
179. ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 11. The survey also found that two-thirds of youth serv-
ice providers do not report relationships between their teen clients and adult males to law enforce-
ment. See id. at 13.
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will be, whether or not the relationship with the father is continuing, and
what type of parental responsibilities he has assumed. If the man is willing
to acknowledge paternity and support the child, then the team should work
out the responsibilities he is willing to undertake, and refer him to social
services as needed. The plan should include a monitoring component, to as-
sure all of those involved that the relationship between the two is not ex-
ploitative or abusive and is not an attempt by the male to avoid prosecution.
Also, it should be designed to educate the girl about her options and to en-
sure that she does not remain with the man out of fear or duress. The prose-
cutor should then dismiss the case with leave to re-file within the law's stat-
ute of limitations period if the man fails to meet the agreed upon conditions,
if there is evidence that the man has abused the teen, or at the teen's request.
While this approach may not ultimately result in more convictions, the
process may empower teens and assist offenders in defining and meeting
their responsibilities. In short, it may help identify families that have a
chance at functioning, and ensure that the law does not impede this chance.
V. PARADOXES, CONFLICTS, AND IRONIES
The current trend toward "get tough" statutory rape policies carries with
it deeper theoretical difficulties. This Part will examine some of the para-
doxical goals of "get tough" policies, the dangers inherent in using the crimi-
nal law to achieve these purposes, and the likelihood that more aggressive
enforcement will fail to achieve these goals. In light of these paradoxes, I
make a more extreme suggestion-that we may want to abolish statutory
rape laws altogether.
A. Paradoxical Priorities
As discussed, the history behind the recent "get tough" policies indicates
that they may have more to do with reducing welfare dependency than with
protecting minors from sexual exploitation. It deserves repeating that these
policies came about in the context of a welfare debate, not a discussion about
sexual abuse or child protection. The quote of one senator is telling:
[T]here is not much we can do from Washington to deal with [statutory rape]
except to ... encourage the States [and] the local prosecuting attorneys ... to
be very aggressive in working with the welfare authorities to once again take
statutory rape as a serious crime and to prosecute it, understanding that this is
done to deter adult men from committing a sexual act that will result in a child
born to poverty. .... 180
180. 141 CONG. REC. S12,687, S12,700 (Sept. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Liebernan) (em-
phasis added).
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Another politician, describing his district's renewed emphasis on statutory
rape, proclaimed: "We will no longer sit back and wait for the welfare bills
to roll in. We're going to be pro-active."18,
If these goals-protection of teens and cutting welfare-coexisted peace-
fully, this "dual track" approach might not be objectionable. Unfortunately
they do not, and when the goals conflict-and they inevitably will-it ap-
pears that it is the teens who lose. For example, recall that the early drafts of
PRWORA would have prevented all teens (including victims of statutory
rape) from ever receiving welfare benefits if they gave birth out of wedlock
and did not subsequently marry the father or a man who would adopt the
child.182 This harsh provision would have had unimaginable consequences
on the quality of life of both the teen and her child. While this provision was
eliminated, it remains true that the welfare reform movement as a whole runs
contrary to the notion of increased support for teen parents. (Indeed, welfare
reform has evinced a hostility toward support for any poor or unwed parent.)
The motivating factor behind the movement is to shrink welfare rolls by re-
ducing the number of children born out of wedlock and to teen parents. To
accomplish this, the states are encouraged to provide "disincentives" for
childbearing, which come in the form of reduced, capped, and time-limited
financial support for single parents. The fewer benefits and support systems
that a teen has to help her in the difficult task of single parenting, the worse
off both she and her baby will be.
Nowhere is the conflict between these paradoxical goals more obvious
than in the decisions of several state courts permitting boys who have been
victims of statutory rape to be sued for child support by the older women that
they have impregnated. The courts reason that a child has the right to receive
support from both of its parents, even when one was the victim of statutory
rape, and articulate a public policy argument against allowing such children
to drain the state's welfare funds. For example, in State ex rel. Hermesmann
v. Seyer, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a thirteen-year-old boy who
was the victim of a statutory rape by his older babysitter had to pay child
support for the offspring that resulted.183 In ordering the boy to pay fifty
dollars per month, the court found that, "[t]his State's interest in requiring
minor parents to support their children overrides the State's competing inter-
est in protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even when such acts may
include criminal activity on the part of the other parent."184
181. Jack Doyle, Executive, Monroe County, New York, quoted in Sorensen, supra note 60.
182. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
183. 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993).
184. Id. at 1279. In addition, the court found the boy jointly and severally liable for the $7068
that the state's Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services had expended on his child since
her birth. See id. at 1275. For a more complete discussion of this case, see John A. Greenbaum,
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Several other state courts have made similar holdings.185 Many of these
decisions are also based on the notion that a consenting participant in sexual
activity-albeit a minor-is not an innocent victim and should not be ex-
cused from responsibility for the consequences. For example, in County of
San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J, the California Court of Appeals found that a
fifteen-year-old boy who had been the victim of statutory rape by a thirty-
four-year-old woman, who became pregnant as a result, was obligated to pay
her child support when he reached the age of eighteen.186 The court specifi-
cally found that Nathaniel should not be excused from the responsibility to
pay child support "because he is not an innocent victim of [the defendant's]
criminal acts," and because he was "injured as a result of criminal conduct in
which he willingly participated."87
Much of the rhetoric surrounding "get tough" statutory rape policies
makes it sound as though the state has a purely benevolent, protective inter-
est in the well-being of teens. As this discussion makes clear, however, the
Government has strong ulterior motives which actually run contrary to this
interest.
B. Use of Statutory Rape Law to Accomplish Other Goals
1. Less invidious-social work, enforcing other laws.
Given the origin of enforcement efforts in welfare reform, it is not sur-
prising that prosecutors' offices and state legislatures have been given a
mandate similar to that of social services offices-namely to reduce teen
pregnancy and welfare receipt. As a result, criminal laws may be used to
address complex social problems that they were not necessarily designed to
combat. These efforts may create an awkward and imperfect "fit" between
the goals of prosecutors and the goals of policymakers. The vast majority of
prosecutors are uncomfortable with the idea that they should be using their
Family Law-Holding a Male Statutory Rape Victim Liable for Child Support, 98 DICK. L. REV.
549 (1994).
185. See, e.g., Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1961) (finding a 16-year-old vic-
tim of statutory rape liable for child support); In re Parentage of J.S., 550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (stressing that public policy dictated that the duty of parental support overrides the right
ofjuveniles to be protected from their own improvident acts); Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d. 515,
518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the child's interest in receiving support supersedes the
harm the minor father suffers from statutory rape); Weinberg v. Omar E., 482 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541
(App. Div. 1984) (stating that the age of the father does not excuse support obligations); Mercer
County Dep't of Soc. Serv's ex rel. Imogene v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Fam. Ct. 1992)
(holding a sixteen-year-old victim of statutory rape legally responsible for child support); In re
Paternity of J.L.H. 441 N.W. 2d 273,276-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, for the purposes of
child support, voluntary sexual intercourse resulted in voluntary parenthood, even though the
child's father was only 15)a.
186. 57 Cal. Rptr.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996).
187. Id. at 845.
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offices to reduce teen pregnancy. In a nationwide survey, only four percent
of those surveyed indicated that they saw reducing teen pregnancy as an ap-
propriate goal of statutory rape prosecution.188
In addition, this places a large burden on prosecutors' offices. Financial
support and resources may be scarce. The "modest suggestion" I outlined in
the previous Part would involve more resources and expertise than most of-
fices can probably spare. Even if prosecutors had the budget and personnel
to implement such a flexible, policy-oriented approach to statutory rape
cases, we would be left wondering whether or not this was a truly efficient
use of law enforcement and judicial resources. Furthermore, the attorneys
must shift their focus from prosecuting crime to engaging in what may look
more like social work.189 It may be the case that attacking a complicated so-
cial issue through prosecution is possible, but, in the process, the prosecu-
tor's role is altered beyond recognition.
As discussed above, in addition to serving as a mechanism to reduce teen
pregnancy, current enforcement strategies may focus on punishing offenders
for more difficult-to-prosecute crimes by using statutory rape laws. Because
statutory rape is a strict liability, age-based offense, prosecutors already may
view it as an easy way to secure a conviction for a man who has committed
other crimes that are harder to prove. This is particularly common in the area
of forcible rape, where legal requirements and juror attitudes make prose-
cuting cases difficult for attorneys and traumatic for victims.190 Statutory
rape may also be used in lieu of prosecutions for physical abuse and non-
payment of child support. A legal advocate for teen parents characterizes the
situation as follows:
The [clients] who want to go after the guy are usually mad about one of two
things: Either there is domestic violence, and she wants him to be prosecuted
for something, or he is not being responsible in terms of taldng care of their
child. I have never had a client complain about something that the [statutory
rape] law was intended to prevent. Usually, everything that the client is mad
about can be covered by other laws-[domestic violence] laws, child support
enforcement, forcible rape laws, etc ..... 191
While this approach may make practical sense in the short-term, continually
falling back on statutory rape to compensate for deficiencies in other areas of
criminal enforcement makes it less likely that these deficiencies will be ex-
188. See ABA study, supra note 75, at 26.
189. See, e.g., id. at 25 (quoting a prosecutor who says she has to "engage in a lot of social
work and hand holding" to prosecute statutory rape cases).
190. See notes 100-101 supra and accompanying text.
191. Scott Interview, supra note 88.
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amined and addressed.192 Furthermore, it carries with it more serious risks,
which are explored below.
2. More invidious-discrimination against the already-marginalized.
While it may seem convenient for prosecutors to attack deadbeat dads,
physical abuse, forcible rape, and intergenerational poverty through statutory
rape laws, using the wrong tool to accomplish a desirable social objective is
fraught with danger. If the application of the law is disconnected from the
law's ostensible purpose, the door is opened for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The law can be used to scapegoat vulnerable parts of the
population, such as low-income people and minorities.193 Or it may be used
as a vehicle for a particular prosecutor's political or social agenda, particu-
larly in the welfare context. A related and disturbing example of this phe-
nomenon occurred recently in Gem County, Idaho. In an attempt to crack
down on teen pregnancy and welfare receipt, Prosecutor Douglas Varie be-
gan charging pregnant, unwed teens who had applied for welfare benefits, for
violating the state's 1921 "anti-fornication" law.194 The prosecutions were
met with public outcry and intense media attention, but were allowed to
stand nonetheless.9s It is unlikely that many prosecutors will be as blatant in
their anti-welfare biases as Varie. Nevertheless, the welfare rolls may make
it easier for prosecutors to find low-income offenders.196
An early empirical study by Martha Fineman indicating the tendency of
prosecutors to use "anti-cohabitation" laws selectively may be instructive in
this context. 97 After surveying prosecutions for violations of Wisconsin's
seldom-enforced cohabitation law, Fineman notes that the "most prevalent
192. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 96, at 289 ("[T]o place all sexual activity in certain age-
based categories under the statutory umbrella of 'assault' or 'rape' misses the real issue, because it
fails to isolate, name, and target those instances of sex that are coercive and that should, for that
reason, be subject to criminal punishment.").
193. See, e.g., ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 6 (recognizing that statutory rape laws impli-
cate sensitive issues of class and culture); Stephanie Goldberg, Jailbait: Politicians Dust off Old Sex
Laws to Combat Teenage Pregnancy, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1997, at 41 (warning that statutory rape laws
"might be used selectively-to punish minority men" or as a "weapon that [draws] on an old preju-
dice-against unwed teenage mothers living in poverty").
194. See Quentin Hardy, Pregnant Girls and Boyfriends Get Hauled Into Court; Welfare is
the Real Issue, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1996, at Al.
195. See Ellen Goodman, Victims of the War on Sin, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 1996, at Op.
Ed. 43 (discussing the case). For an argument that fornication laws serve useful normative purposes
and prevent disease and extramarital pregnancy, see Traci Shallbetter Stratton, Comment, No More
Messing Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73
WASH. L. REV. 767 (1998).
196. See, e.g., ABA STUDY, supra note 75, at 6 (noting that girls who must rely on public so-
cial services are far more likely to have their unlawful relationships reported than girls who can pay
for private services).
197. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-
Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 275.
Jan. 2000]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 503 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
class of prosecutions ... [involved] those initiated because the district attor-
ney believed that some form of welfare fraud or abuse was occurring."198
She found that such prosecutions were usually used in two types of situa-
tions: 1) where authorities suspected that a woman receiving welfare was
living with a man who was actually contributing to the household, but whose
income was unreported; and 2) where the statute was used to coerce admis-
sions of paternity when the couple had an illegitimate child.199 In the latter
instance, Fineman quotes a prosecutor as stating that "he employed the [co-
habitation] statute in order to 'stop the baby machine' from producing addi-
tional mouths for the state to feed."200 Finally, Fineman found that even in
counties where there were no prosecutions for cohabitation, some district
attorneys used threats of prosecution to coerce behaviors such as marriage,
paternity acknowledgment, and acceptance of parental responsibilities.201
One commentator argues that such "[i]nconsistent enforcement under-
mines respect for the rule of law and leads to charges that prejudices based
on race, class, or other inappropriate criteria are driving enforcement deci-
sions."202 This argument is particularly salient with regard to class, given the
strong anti-welfare motivations behind the current wave of statutory rape
enforcement.03
C. Ironic Results
Ironically, recent research has seriously called into question the feasibil-
ity of using statutory rape laws to address the problem of teen pregnancy.
The early studies, discussed at the beginning of this note, contained shocking
statistics about the age differences between teen mothers and their adult male
partners. However, further analysis revealed that the problem, while wide-
spread, was unlikely to be easily combated by "get tough" policies.
One reason for this lack of effectiveness is the vagueness of the term
"teen." The early, influential studies included all girls between the ages of
twelve and nineteen in the term "teen." However, a recent nationwide study
found that nearly two-thirds of all teenagers who have babies are eighteen- or
198. Id. at 289.
199. See id. at 290-91.
200. Id. at 291.
201. See id. at297 nn.89-91.
202. Michael W. Lynch, Enforcing "Statutory Rape"?, PUB. INTEREST, July 1, 1998, at 3.
203. Nevertheless, at least one state court has concluded that statutory rape is no more subject
to abusive exercise of prosecutorial discretion or discriminatory enforcement practices than any
other crime. See State v. Barlow, 630 A.2d 1299 (Vt. 1993). In fact, the court reasoned, statutory
rape may be even less susceptible to such practices because of the clear-cut nature of the violation,
arguing, "[n]othing more than a calendar and the person's birth certificate are required to determine
the statute's applicability." Id. at 1301.
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nineteen-years-old, too old to be covered by any state's statutory rape law.204
In addition, close to one-quarter (twenty-three percent) of minors who have a
child fathered by an older man are married at the time of the birth-a defense
to statutory rape in every state.205 Finally, the study found that most of the
age differences were small enough that many prosecutors' offices were likely
to overlook them. For example, nationally only thirteen percent of non-
marital births to girls between the ages of fifteen and nineteen involved girls
aged fifteen to seventeen and men at least four years older.206 Only eight
percent of these births involved girls between fifteen and seventeen and men
at least five years older.207 Cases with the truly dramatic age differences
usually occurred when girls were under fifteen-which account for fewer
than three percent of all teenage births.208 When all of these factors are com-
bined, the result is that far fewer teen pregnancies are affected by statutory
rape law than was previously believed.
This new information caused some experts to distance themselves from
the notion that criminal sanctions are a desirable way to fight teen pregnancy.
Michael Males, author of one of the original studies which led to the in-
creased enforcement trend209, stated forcefully: "We have a small and con-
centrated problem of girls having babies with older men .... I think there is
very little sexual predation and very little coercion. I would like to take the
press and horsewhip them for the way they've let politicians take the num-
bers and hype it."210 Laura Lindberg and the co-authors of a later study (dis-
cussed above) conclude that "get tough" policies "are unlikely to be the
magic bullet to reduce rates of adolescent childbearing."211 It is important to
recognize, however, that this information does not mean that the enforcement
of statutory rape laws will have no effect on teen parents. As noted in the
previous Part, even laws which are seldom enforced can be used as threats,
or selectively used to target marginalized groups. Furthermore, the knowl-
edge that their partners could be prosecuted may still deter teens from seek-
ing social or medical services for fear of detection.212
204. See Lindberg et al., supra note 84, at 63.
205. See id. at 65.
206 See id at 65 n.t.
207. See id. at 65.
208. See id. at 66.
209 Males & Chew, supra note 40.
210. Michael Males, quoted in Tougher Statutory Rape Laws Sought by Politicians,
CHARLESTON GAZEIrE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 6, 1997, at A14.
211. Lindberg et al., supra note 84, at 66.
212. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 128, at 33 (quoting several youth service professionals
who express the fear that teens will not seek medical care or other supportive services); ABA
STUDY, supra note 75, at 21 (noting that awareness by girls that their relationships may be reported
may deter them from seeking care related to contraception, prenatal care, and sexually transmitted
diseases).
Jan. 2000]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 505 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
D. A More Extreme Proposal
From the previous sections, we can draw a few general conclusions: in
the context of the anti-welfare origins of the "get tough" statutory rape poli-
cies, concern about the exploitation of teens may well give way to concerns
over the public purse; statutory rape laws are susceptible to being used to
accomplish goals (more or less invidious) for which they were not designed;
and statutory rape laws, even if more vigorously enforced, are unlikely to
impact teen pregnancy rates in any significant way.
Thus, I have a second, more extreme proposal for reforming the en-
forcement of statutory rape laws: Eliminate them, at least in their current
form and as they apply to the majority of offenders. Instead, increase the
penalties for and enforcement of the underlying behaviors which we find to
be the real "crimes." The real "crime" that the welfare-reform-inspired "get
tough" policies seek to punish is fathering a child and then failing to take
responsibility for it. Society is also concerned about preventing relationships
which are abusive, exploitative, and coercive for teens, such as those in-
volving forcible rape, "chemical" rape (when a man provides a girl with
drugs or alcohol in order to obtain sex), and physical abuse, or where the
man is in a position of authority over the girl. These are the culpable be-
haviors that make most teen-adult sexual relationships of such concern. But
each and every one of these culpable behaviors is already illegal, and so can
be addressed through improving the enforcement of existing laws.
I propose maling the fact that the victim is a minor an aggravating factor
in the underlying offense, resulting in increased penalties.23 For example,
the fact that the girl is a minor in a domestic violence or rape case should
result in a large sentencing enhancement. The fact that the girl is a minor
should cause the state to increase the child support that the man must pay, at
least until the girl reaches the age of majority (or even afterward, to reflect
the impact that teen pregnancy may have had on her ability to complete
school and get a good job).
States should still be able to create categorical prohibitions on specific
types of sexual relationships. For example, legislatures could still define a
cut-off age somewhere in the early teens (for instance, age fourteen) below
213. Another commentator has proposed a similar approach, recommending that legislatures
lower the punishment for statutory rape "to a fairly minimal level." Britton Guerrina, Comment,
Mitigating Punishment for Statutory Rape, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 1251, 1274 (1998). They can then
specify aggravating factors such as abusive behavior, large age differences between the victim and
the offender, and whether the offender has a prior history of committing sex offenses, which courts
can use to increase the penalty in order to correspond with the offender's "relative dangerousness
and culpability." Id. However, as this note has argued, convictions may still have corollary nega-
tive consequences, impede the man's ability to provide for the family, and interfere vith the cou-
ple's privacy and parenting rights, regardless of the leniency of the sentence.
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which sexual activity counts as child abuse. States could also define a list of
individuals in teens' lives-such as teachers, coaches, doctors, and camp
counselors-who are always prohibited from engaging in sex with them due
to the potential for coercion and improper use of authority. Recognizing that
the potential for coercion and exploitation increases as the difference in ages
between the parties increases, states could even prohibit sex between minors
and adults who are more than a certain number of years (for instance, ten
years) older than they are.
Given all the relationships that the law would still reach under this pro-
posal, it is important to point out exactly the type of relationship that would
not be covered: non-abusive, consensual relationships between teens (over
age thirteen) and young adults who are themselves in their teens and early
twenties (i.e., not more than ten years older), and who are not in positions of
authority over the teen. While this sounds like a narrow category of relation-
ships, it in fact accounts for the majority of relationships currently classified
and prosecuted as statutory rape today.
This approach has many advantages. Unlike the current regime, which
sweeps in consensual and supportive relationships, this approach targets ex-
ploitative and dangerous relationships. It is far less susceptible to arbitrary
or discriminatory application because its application is congruent with its
purpose-to prevent the abuse of teens by adults. Finally, such a focus may
result in the strengthening and improvement of the laws and enforcement
mechanisms surrounding forcible rape, domestic violence, and nonpayment
of child support, which have too often been ignored when a statutory rape
charge can be made. While this proposal may not be a very effective tool in
reducing teen pregnancy, the existing system does not appear to be effective
either. Of course, this framework still leaves open the possibility of relation-
ships which society will find morally repugnant-for example, a naive fif-
teen-year-old and her selfish, twenty-three-year-old boyfriend. However, we
are likely to find such relationships repugnant because we assume the girl is
being coerced, or because she will be left with a baby and no one to help her
care for it. If she is, then the existing laws should be used to punish him,
with an "age-enhancement" that expresses society's particular disapproval of
such conduct as directed toward minors.
I do not reach this proposal lightly. I recognize that it diverges from the
purpose of statutory rape law, which is to punish sex between minors and
adults, regardless of pregnancy or the quality of their relationship. It is also
true that this approach may ultimately discount the deleterious consequences
that even non-abusive, consensual sexual relationships with adults can have
for teens. Naturally, in an ideal world, fewer teens would be having sex and
finding themselves pregnant, regardless of the age of their partners. How-
ever, it is one thing to recognize teen pregnancy and sexual involvement with
older men as a serious issue worthy of attention, and quite another to address
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this issue by making all such relationships serious crimes. This proposal
may find use as an example of an alternative paradigm for dealing with the
problem of statutory rape, one which takes an instrumental and analytical-
rather than a purely normative-approach.
CONCLUSION
The low-income parenting teen is in an extremely difficult position. At
the very least, she will probably need financial assistance, emotional support,
and help completing school. At the most, she may need long-term child-
care, parenting support, or housing. Turning to statutory rape law as a way
to prevent the relationships that cause the pregnancies is an appealing solu-
tion for many people on both sides of the political aisle. But simplistic solu-
tions to complex problems always call for scrutiny.
Harsh statutory rape laws and their aggressive enforcement deprive some
teens of both a source of possible support and the ability to make meaningful
decisions about their families and their futures. The current system may not
be able to determine when intervention is appropriate and when it is not.
State legislatures have the political incentive to come up with stricter laws
and harsher penalties, so that they can win federal dollars and appear to be
"solving" the teen pregnancy problem. In short, turning this area over to the
criminal justice system rather than social services carries attendant risks.
The response may be overly punitive, less appropriate to individual needs
and situations, and less targeted to the more intractable issues of teen preg-
nancy and poverty.
Teen parents occupy a central position in many of today's most conten-
tious policy debates, yet they have almost no political power. Congress and
the pundits have multiple avenues for expressing their disapproval and dis-
gust, and imposing their policies for change. Teen parents, whom these poli-
cies most directly affect, have almost none. The issue is too important to be
lost in the emotional, partisan fray of welfare politics. It would be beneficial
to all of those involved-the teens whom these policies impact, as well as the
policy makers who want their policies to be effective-if we could take a
step back from the rancorous debate and take a hard, unbiased look at how
"get tough" statutory rape policies will actually affect the lives of teen par-
ents.
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